# 1NC

## Off

### 1NC – T

#### Topical affirmatives must advocate a policy whereby the United States federal government expands the scope of one or more of its core antitrust laws.

#### Resolved means to enact a policy by law.

Words & Phrases ’64 [Words and Phrases; 1964; Permanent Edition]

Definition of the word “resolve,” given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;” It is of similar force to the word “enact,” which is defined by Bouvier as meaning “to establish by law”.

#### The United States federal government is the national government in DC.

Black’s Law ‘4 [Black’s Law Dictionary; 6/1/4; 8th Edition, p. 716]

Federal government. 1. A national government that exercises some degree of control over smaller political units that have surrendered some degree of power in exchange for the right to participate in national politics matters – Also termed (in federal states) central government. 2. the U.S. government – Also termed national government. [Cases: United States -1 C.J.S. United States - - 2-3]

#### Should means mandating something be done.

Nieto ‘9 [Judge Henry Nieto, Colorado Court of Appeals, 8-20-2009 People v. Munoz, 240 P.3d 311 (Colo. Ct. App. 2009)]

"Should" is "used . . . to express duty, obligation, propriety, or expediency." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2104 (2002). Courts [\*\*15] interpreting the word in various contexts have drawn conflicting conclusions, although the weight of authority appears to favor interpreting "should" in an imperative, obligatory sense. HN7A number of courts, confronted with the question of whether using the word "should" in jury instructions conforms with the Fifth and Sixth Amendment protections governing the reasonable doubt standard, have upheld instructions using the word. In the courts of other states in which a defendant has argued that the word "should" in the reasonable doubt instruction does not sufficiently inform the jury that it is bound to find the defendant not guilty if insufficient proof is submitted at trial, the courts have squarely rejected the argument. They reasoned that the word "conveys a sense of duty and obligation and could not be misunderstood by a jury." See State v. McCloud, 257 Kan. 1, 891 P.2d 324, 335 (Kan. 1995); see also Tyson v. State, 217 Ga. App. 428, 457 S.E.2d 690, 691-92 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995) (finding argument that "should" is directional but not instructional to be without merit); Commonwealth v. Hammond, 350 Pa. Super. 477, 504 A.2d 940, 941-42 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986). Notably, courts interpreting the word "should" in other types of jury instructions [\*\*16] have also found that the word conveys to the jury a sense of duty or obligation and not discretion. In Little v. State, 261 Ark. 859, 554 S.W.2d 312, 324 (Ark. 1977), the Arkansas Supreme Court interpreted the word "should" in an instruction on circumstantial evidence as synonymous with the word "must" and rejected the defendant's argument that the jury may have been misled by the court's use of the word in the instruction. Similarly, the Missouri Supreme Court rejected a defendant's argument that the court erred by not using the word "should" in an instruction on witness credibility which used the word "must" because the two words have the same meaning. State v. Rack, 318 S.W.2d 211, 215 (Mo. 1958). [\*318] In applying a child support statute, the Arizona Court of Appeals concluded that a legislature's or commission's use of the word "should" is meant to convey duty or obligation. McNutt v. McNutt, 203 Ariz. 28, 49 P.3d 300, 306 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002) (finding a statute stating that child support expenditures "should" be allocated for the purpose of parents' federal tax exemption to be mandatory).

#### Prohibitions are legal restrictions against certain conduct.

DLD ‘ND [Duhaime's Law Dictionary; “Prohibition Definition”; http://www.duhaime.org/LegalDictionary/P/Prohibition.aspx; AS]

A legal restriction against the use of something or against certain conduct.

#### The core antitrust laws are the Sherman, FTC, and Clayton Acts.

CoC ‘ND [Chamber of Commerce; “Antitrust Laws”; https://www.uschamber.com/antitrust-laws; AS]

America’s Antitrust Laws Protect Competition and Benefit Consumers

Antitrust laws ensure competition in a free and open market economy, which is the foundation of any vibrant economy. And healthy competition among sellers in an open marketplace gives consumers the benefits of lower prices, higher quality products and services, more choices, and greater innovation.

The core of U.S. antitrust law was created by three pieces of legislation: the Sherman Antitrust Act, the Federal Trade Commission Act, and the Clayton Antitrust Act. These laws have evolved along with the market, vigilantly guarding against anti-competitive harm that arises from abuse of dominance, bid rigging, price fixing, and customer allocation.

#### Debate is a game and we’re both here to win – this means procedural questions like T come first. The role of the ballot is to vote for whoever does the better debating over the resolutional question.

#### Vote neg:

#### First is debatability – their interpretation eviscerates predictable limits – all negative strategy is premised off a predictable reading of the resolution. The lack of a predictable mechanism lets them radically re-contextualize their aff and erase neg ground via perms. Including their advocacy authorizes any methodology or orientation tangentially related to the topic, which renders research burdens untenable. That outweighs and precedes their offense – debate is a game that we’ve all chosen to participate in and requires effective negation. It makes no sense to skew a competitive activity in favor of one side.

#### Second is clash – you should privilege debate over different political paradigms over endorsing any one political paradigm. Predetermined commitments ignore the complexity and partiality of any political theory. Promoting clash is key to interrogate complex issues, problematize solutions, and actualize any benefits of debate.

### 1NC – Markets K

#### Conflating capitalism and competitive markets buys into neoliberal ideology that markets are intrinsically self-regulating. Markets are important tools for a democratic political economy. The neoliberals turned debates about hierarchy versus democracy into a debate about the market versus the state.

Johanna **BOCKMAN** Sociology @ George Mason **’11** *Markets in the name of socialism: the left-wing origins of neoliberalism* p. 2-6

In general, scholars have presented three accounts of how economists developed and spread neoliberalism. Each assumes that economists have always taken a side either for the state or for the market and thus that every economist can be located on a state–market axis. The first account focuses on individual right-wing economists, most significantly Milton Friedman and Friedrich von Hayek, who developed radical free market ideas that form the core of neoliberalism. A strategic network of right-wing think tanks, associations like the Mont Pelerin Society, and foundations like that of the Scaife family packaged these neoliberal ideas and used them worldwide to attack any state role in the economy, from regulation to Keynesianism to central planning (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1999; Campbell 1998; Centeno 1998; Cockett 1995; Hartwell 1995; Har- vey 2005; Kelly 1997; Klein 2007; Mirowski and Plehwe 2009; Smith 1993; Valdés 1995; Yergin and Stanislaw 1998).3 In her Shock Doctrine, Naomi Klein (2007) argues that Milton Friedman and other neoclassical economists took advantage of economic crises to realize this radical free market package as shock therapy, which produced “disaster capitalism” worldwide.

A second type of account suggests that neoclassical economics, with its free market models, acts as a kind of neoliberal Trojan horse (Aligica and Evans 2009; Biglaiser 2002; Kogut and Macpherson 2007).4 In his A Brief History of Neoliberalism, David Harvey (2005) brilliantly describes neoliberalism as a political project to restore the power of economic elites after the successes of the left in 1960s, but he conflates neoliberalism and neoclassical economics.5 Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher came to power with a mandate to realize this political project, bringing it together with a separate “utopian project” to realize right-wing economists’ vision of free market capitalism that masked the political project. According to many authors, this neoliberal vision is based on neoclassical economics, in opposition to Marxism. Harvey writes:

The neoliberal label signaled their [these economists’] adherence to those free market principles of neoclassical economics that had emerged in the second half of the nine- teenth century (thanks to the work of Alfred Marshall, William Stanley Jevons, and Leon Walras) to displace the classical theories of Adam Smith, David Ricardo, and, of course, Karl Marx. (2005: 20)

Harvey finds the core of neoliberalism in neoclassical economics with its “free market principles.” Sociologists Campbell and Pedersen similarly argue that “a deep, taken-for-granted belief in neoclassical economics” forms the core of neoliberalism (2001: 5). Scott Sernau represents a more generally held view:

Many nations around the world were discovering the ideas of free trade and free markets. The intellectual basis for this approach comes from neoclassical economics. This approach is sometimes termed neoliberalism . . . Thus neoliberalism is the eco- nomic philosophy of American political conservatives . . . On the international level, the IMF and the World Bank champion their own form of neoclassical economics. (2010: 39–40)

Neoclassical economics, many observers agree, has played a fundamental role in the rise of neoliberalism worldwide. The conversion of much of the world to neoclassical economic thinking, according to these accounts, led to support for neoliberalism and thus undermined socialism, which did indeed suffer a cataclysmic decline from the late 1980s.

The third type of account points to economists with American neo- classical training who gained powerful positions in international financial institutions, such as the World Bank and the IMF, which impose neo- liberal ideas on countries around the globe and support the formation of neoliberal advocates worldwide (Babb 2001; Dezalay and Garth 2002; Henisz, Zelner, and Guillén 2005; Orenstein 2008).6 Economists within these institutions and their worldwide network of advocates successfully replaced state-led development with neoliberal free market policies. These three arguments work nicely together to demonstrate how economists’ ideological project worked in parallel with business elites’ political project to reorganize capitalism and reestablish their own power (Blyth 2002; Harvey 2005; Klein 2007).

This manuscript builds on, but also criticizes, these three types of ac- counts by revealing the socialist origins of neoliberalism. The right-wing, capitalist origins of neoliberalism have been clearly demonstrated. Observers have noted that not only right-wing leaders, such as Pinochet in Chile and Fujimori in Peru, but also socialists, such as those in Western Eu- rope and Latin America, implemented neoliberal policies (Bourdieu and Grass 2002; Mudge 2008; Sader 2008). To understand this, I argue that we should not conflate neoliberalism and neoclassical economics, we should not assume that neoclassical economics is a capitalist science or ideology, and, most importantly, we should go beyond the state–market axis.

I define neoliberalism as a set of ideas about how to organize markets, states, enterprises, and populations, which shape government policies.7 These policies include deregulation, liberalization of trade and capital flows, anti-inflationary stabilization, and privatization of state enterprises. My understanding of the debates in Eastern Europe and about Eastern Europe in the early 1990s informs this definition.8 The most striking characteristic of neoliberalism has been its advocacy of free, unfettered competitive markets, or in the words of Joseph Stiglitz its “market fun- damentalism” (2003: 74).9 According to neoliberal ideology, competitive markets and prices, free from political intervention or bureaucratic in- terests, could and should take over state functions. Competitive market prices could guide governance more effectively and more justly than the state could. At the same time, neoliberals call for a strong or even au- thoritarian state to protect private property, as well as to create private property and markets.10 Neoliberalism also privileges the power of man- agers and owners and attacks the rights or potential rights of employees (Harvey 2005). There is a distinct lack of concern among neoliberals about the inefficiencies and concentrations of power within large corporations (Mirowski 2009: 438). Finally, Milton Friedman, Friedrich von Hayek, and other neoliberals also had a commitment to capitalism, a kind of capitalism with the qualities listed above: free markets, authoritarian yet small states, and hierarchical firms controlled by managers and owners, rather than by workers. In sum, neoliberalism avidly supports all of the following:

1. competitive markets

2. smaller, authoritarian states

3. hierarchical firms, management, and owners

4. capitalism

Someone who supports only one of these elements, even competitive markets but not the others, is not necessarily neoliberal.

This fourfold definition avoids the common assumption that economists are either pro-state or promarket. As Timothy Mitchell (1990) argues, elites “enframe” the world into dichotomies, constructing a seemingly dualistic world—Soviet socialism versus Western free market capitalism, for instance—to bolster their own authority. The state–market dichotomy obscures the nature of economics and elite power. This dichotomy easily blurs into other dichotomies: between socialism and capitalism, between central planning and the market, between Keynesianism and monetarism, between Latin American structuralist economics and American neoliberalism, and between Marxism and neoclassical economics. As a result, arguments about the state almost effortlessly become a mishmash of arguments about socialism, central planning, Keynesianism, Latin American economic structuralism, and neoclassical economics. In contrast, I have found that neoclassical economists, in their professional writing, do not focus on whether they are for or against the competitive market; rather, they use markets, central planning, socialism, and neoclassical econom- ics simultaneously as analytical tools and sometimes as normative models. They have also been more concerned about another axis altogether: hierarchy and democracy. For example, some neoclassical economists advocated markets and rejected state planning in the name of economic democracy and communism. Thus, these economists criticized state socialism and state capitalism, as well as corporations, with the goal of ending worker exploitation and creating a new form of socialism. Another set of neoclas- sical economists also advocated markets but assumed hierarchical firms and an authoritarian state. The state–market axis used in public discourse hides a very different conversation going on within professional economics.

My approach complements, but also deviates from, Foucauldian studies of neoliberalism. In his lectures at the Collège de France in 1978 and 1979, Michel Foucault (2008) discussed neoliberalism as a form of governmentality. Those following Foucault understand neoliberal gov- ernmentality as seeking to manage populations by shaping individuals as governable, self-disciplined, enterprising subjectivities—thus engineering their souls—and by governing them from a distance, not though direct intervention by state agents, but by calculation, guidance, and incentives (Ong 2006; Rose 1996: 1999). Using this approach in his study of Czecho- slovak technocrats, Gil Eyal (2003) has demonstrated that neoliberalism also emerged independently from capitalism and out of Eastern European socialism. Eyal has suggested that neoliberalism is not necessarily capitalist but rather is an art of governance possible under a variety of economic systems. By highlighting the ways that state, market, and expert power were fused in a new neoliberal configuration during socialism, Eyal pro- ductively avoids assuming that economists have always taken a side ei- ther for the state or for the market. Yet, while the Foucauldian approach has produced many insights into neoliberalism, it collapses alternatives to neoliberalism, including socialisms, into neoliberalism as simply other examples of engineering the soul. To understand the views of neoclassical economists more generally, one must move beyond the state–market axis to recognize the variety of socialisms that neoclassical economists have explored since the nineteenth century.

In the United States and now around the world, neoclassical eco- nomics represents the mainstream of the economics discipline. Neoclas- sical economics differs from heterodox economics, including Marxism, evolutionary economics, and the Austrian School after the Second World War, which this book only briefly discusses. Keynesians, libertarian and monetarist Chicago School economists like Milton Friedman, and many Eastern European socialists all practiced this neoclassical economics, while Friedrich von Hayek and the Austrian School abandoned this practice after the Second World War. Neoclassical pioneer and Keynesian Paul Samuel- son acknowledged this view: “Economists do agree on much in any situ- ation” (1983: 5). For example, in regards to Milton Friedman, Samuelson continued, “I could disagree 180o with his policy conclusion and yet con- cur in diagnosis of the empirical observations and inferred probabilities” (1983: 5–6).11 Therefore, to understand neoliberalism, we must separate neoliberalism and neoclassical economics and leave behind the common assumption that neoclassical economics is a science of capitalism.

#### Competitive markets are a potential tool of socialism. Focus on the structure of firms supports decentralization and more democratic control.

Johanna **BOCKMAN** Sociology @ George Mason **’11** *Markets in the name of socialis: the left-wing origins of neoliberalism* p. 6-9

William Stanley Jevons in England, Carl Menger in Austria, and Léon Walras in Switzerland are generally credited with simultaneously discovering neoclassical economics in the 1870s.12 Neoclassical economists moved beyond the classical view that the value of goods is based on the objective costs of their production (the labor theory of value) to the neoclassical view that value is subjective or perceived, that the individual agent—an individual or a firm—judges the utility or usefulness of certain goods or services. This shift to a subjective understanding of value and prices in the 1870s created what became known as the Marginalist Revolution be- cause neoclassical economists began to study individual agents’ behavior at the margins, such as the additional satisfaction a consumer gains from each extra (or marginal) unit of consumption. This is why neoclassical economics is often referred to as “marginalism.”13 While not all neoclassical economists used mathematics, such marginalist understandings of economic behavior allowed economists to apply calculus, theorems, and metaphors from physics to the field of economics, which seemed to promise a new scientific foundation based on the regularities of the mechani- cal world (Mirowski 1989).14 Neoclassical economists also studied how markets coordinate agents in some regular way, thus allowing economists to describe and predict collective action. These economists assumed that markets (individually and collectively) have at least one equilibrium state in which prices encourage the most efficient production, distribution, and consumption. Neoclassical economics was not immediately popular among economists but became the mainstream by the Second World War (Bernstein 2001; Howey 1989; Yonay 1998). In sum, neoclassical economics is characterized by the study of individual agents, subjective values and prices, marginal calculation, collective action through markets, and market equilibrium.15

Neoliberalism can be said to have socialist origins for three reasons: Economists use socialist models to create new knowledge; these socialist models allowed for a professional dialogue among neoclassical economists in the socialist East and the capitalist West; and neoliberalism incorpo- rates the knowledge created in this transnational dialogue about social- ism. I explain each of these points in the following paragraphs.

First, while the language of individuals, markets, and prices suggests a capitalist perspective on the economy, socialism in fact plays a foundational role in neoclassical economics. Because some neoclassical economists have played a central role in promoting and implementing neoliberal polices, this suggests that neoliberalism has socialist origins. Neoclassical founders created mathematical models of the entire economy and showed that freely competitive markets produced optimal results in production, distribution, and consumption. Unexpectedly, by the 1890s, neoclassical economists also discovered that the competitive market economy was mathematically identical to the centrally planning economy. An economist could, therefore, take the mathematical models of the market and, rather than predicting how a free market might act, the economist could solve the equations and figure out the best prices and quantities without a market. Economists developed models of a “socialist state” with a central planner and state ownership of the means of production to develop new neoclassical theories and tools. As a result, both the pure competitive market and centrally planned socialism sit together at the center of neoclassical economics, no matter the politics of an economist. The methodological centrality of socialism to neoclassical economics informs neoliberalism. Today, neoclassical economists still regularly use models of a social- ist state to develop their theories. Former head of the China division at the International Monetary Fund and current advisor to the Indian govern- ment Eswar Prasad recently stated, “We economists think that a benevo- lent dictator—a benevolent dictator with a heart in the right place—could actually do a lot of good” (Kestenbaum 2010). Prasad does not voice some eccentric view. A benevolent dictator, more usually called “the social plan- ner,” appears throughout mainstream economic writing. The Chicago School (for example, Becker, Murphy, and Grossman 2006) and the ratio- nal expectations school (Hansen and Sargent [1994] 1996; Kydland and Prescott 1982; Lucas 1972; Lucas and Prescott 1971),16 as well as the more left-leaning market failure school (Dasgupta and Stiglitz 1980a,b), base their models on a hypothesized social planner.17 According to economists, the social planner is an imaginary benevolent representative for all of soci- ety. This planner has complete information about costs and preferences.18 With perfect knowledge and certainty, the social planner chooses, for ex- ample, production activities to maximize consumption. In this way, the social planner seeks to maximize social welfare for all members of society. The economist then evaluates the results of a new policy or institution in comparison with the results obtained by the social planner, which serve as a benchmark. As this book shows, the social planner is the socialist state as imagined in the 1890s. Mainstream economists, no matter their political persuasion, mobilized state socialist models to study all economic systems and policies.

Neoliberalism appears as disembedded liberalism, as a commitment to unfettered markets (Blyth 2002), when, in fact, institutions are always the object of debate. If we understand institutions as taken for granted social patterns, then markets and planning should also be considered institutions, but I have found that neoclassical economists think about markets and planning differently from other institutions. On the surface, some economists present a narrow interpretation of neoclassical economics that markets and any necessary institutions would spring up like mushrooms when the state retreated from the economy. Alternatively, Eastern Euro- pean conservatives also offered a narrow view of neoclassical economics, which instead argued that central planning and any necessary institutions would spring up like mushrooms when markets disappeared. Markets and a centrally planned socialist state exist at the core of neoclassical econom- ics and thus embody these narrow views. However, narrow interpretations merely take the existing institutions as given (Horvat 1961, 2). Neoclassical economists continually talk about institutions required for the successful functioning of these core elements, the market or the centrally planned socialist state.

Neoclassical economists claim that both competitive markets and central planning require either (1) hierarchical, authoritarian institutions or (2) decentralized, egalitarian, democratic institutions. For example, economists David Lipton and Jeffrey Sachs argued for the necessity of hierarchical institutions, such as large (often foreign) corporations that have the funds to buy state-owned firms, for the eradication of worker self-management and ownership due to their supposed inefficiencies, and for a strong state to enforce massive redistribution of resources. In con- trast, some socialist economists in Germany and England in the early part of the twentieth century optimistically thought that socialist institutions would make the economy actually resemble the ideal neoclassical models of the free market. These institutions included state or social ownership of certain parts of the economy, worker ownership of firms, workers’ self- management, cooperative ownership, and various forms of democracy, as well as antimonopoly laws and company autonomy, that would make free markets, as well as efficient and just socialism, possible. Thus, an economist like Joseph Stiglitz has been equally committed to competitive markets and to economic democracy. In the eyes of neoclassical economists, this was not a mix of systems, a little bit of socialism mixed with a little bit of capitalism, like some image of Keynesianism. Rather, these economists sought a fully competitive market and socialism. The fact that neoclassical economists speak so positively about markets confuses outsiders into thinking that they are necessarily neoliberal.

#### Markets and competition should work with care and cooperation. The aff makes the mechanical masculinist image of zero-sum competition in markets into a self-fulfilling prophecy.

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Justice and Care

All of this analysis suggests that, far from being opposed to each other, justice and care are as two legs, or two sides of coin. The two orientations may be analytically distinguishable (according to a categorization that we ourselves create—just like we create gender), but they are united in practice. Putting them into a gender-value compass, we can think of them having a positive complementarity, as illustrated in the top two cells of Figure 3. The bottom two cells indicate, again, what happens if we try to have one without the other. The illusion that justice can exist without care leads to coldness. On the other hand, an overly sentimental emphasis on care, to the exclusion of justice, leads to unjustifiable favoritism. One can also think of another problem with purely rational justice being a lack of motivation to act, while unreflective impulsiveness can be a problem with an empathy-only approach.

Table

Description automatically generated

For example, consider a picture that appeared in national newspapers many years ago. The photo showed an Latin American family sitting around an aged and lonely immigrant man whom they had taken into their circle of friendship, care, and protection. Very nice. The old man, however, was Dr. Josef Mengele, the notorious Nazi war criminal. I use this to remind myself that one should not one-sidedly elevate considerations of care over considerations of justice.

Implications for Economies

Neoclassical economics teaches that markets and businesses are mechanical mechanisms populated by self-interested, autonomous "economic man." Individual consumers or workers are seen as discrete, separative agents who maximize mathematical utility functions, while firms are portrayed as discrete, separative economic actors that maximize mathematical profit functions. If these teachings were true, only the thinnest sort of rationalist and individualist ethics might be applicable. In fact, the only ethical judgment admitted by many mainstream economists is to hold sacrosanct the value of free individual choice.

Is Ethics Unnecessary/ Impossible?

Conservative, free-market economists furthermore argue that ethical considerations beyond this are unnecessary, because the "invisible hand" of markets automatically assures that self-interested actions serve the social good. In contrast, critics from the political left say that incorporating rich ethical considerations in market-oriented systems is impossible, because the juggernaut of global corporate capitalism obeys only its own inhuman rules. Because firms are profit maximizers, these critics reason, the capitalist system simply institutionalizes greed and self-interested competition. Ethical action therefore, it is reasoned, requires supplanting this system with something else— something more altruistic and cooperative. If one assumes that businesses are intrinsically mechanical and anti-social, then the idea of "business ethics," much less "care ethics" in business, seems impossible.

But is it?

But what if the economy is not a machine, and people in their economic lives are not "economic man"? The feminist analysis described above notes that these beliefs are based, not on empirical study of actual behavior, but on a physics-envy methodological bias and the macho image of the separative self.5 There is, in fact, plenteous evidence that these beliefs are wildly off the mark. The biased nature of these beliefs can be examined at three organizational levels: the level of human individuals, the level of businesses, and the level of markets.

Individuals Are Not "Economic Man"

Starting with the simplest organizational unit—the human individual—there is, in fact, considerable empirical evidence that people do not leave their feelings, values, ethics, sociality, and search for meaning behind when they enter commercial life. The vast business literature on the psychology of employee motivation, for example, shows that people are complex social animals, even when at work (Herzberg 1987). Research on motivation finds that people are generally motivated by a mix of intrinsic rewards (such as enjoyment or a feeling of contributing to something worthwhile) and extrinsic rewards (such as money or status) (Ryan and Deci 2000). Phenomena of care, including caring about one's coworkers or customers, caring about the quality of the product or service one provides, or caring about the impact of one's business on the world, are endemic to well- run businesses—as well as often missing in poorly-run ones (Kusnet 2008). Feminist economists have been especially interested in this topic, since so many women have traditionally been employed in "caring work" such as nursing or teaching (Folbre and Nelson 2000). Of course, other human motivations besides caring—including a desire for dominance or revenge, or a desire to maintain rigid hierarchies of race, class, or gender— show up in the workplace as well. The unemotional, a-social employee who gets only disutility from expending effort at work, and utility from pay, is a fiction invented by economists.

Academics may be more likely to acknowledge our own nonpecuniary interests in our work, than the possibility of nonpecuniary interests on the part of business leaders. While we generally feel that we do our work at least partly for the love of knowledge or learning, or for the social good, we may assume that a business person qua businessperson must be interested only in money. But consider how some leaders talk about what they do. For example, David Packard (of Hewlett-Packard) once said, ‘Profit...is not the proper end and aim of management – it is what makes all of the proper ends and aims possible,’ with the proper aim being to ‘make a contribution to society’ (Collins and Porras 1994).Others talk about feeling good about providing jobs, needed services in a community, quality bread, path breaking books, interesting innovations, environmental improvements, or express pride in carrying on a legacy or tradition. Don't most people want to do something worthwhile? Surveys of business leaders suggest that shareholders are often only one of many constituencies considered in decision making (along with workers, communities, suppliers, creditors and so on).6

Some executives, of course, have bought into pure "bottom line," money-oriented, short-term thinking, and blare on loudly about it in the press and in business publishing. And some leaders, it may be objected, may voice interests in jobs or the environment purely as a public relations move. But—speaking here entirely on the level of individual motivations—isn't there something quite dehumanizing about taking the stereotype of the greedy, single-minded Chief Executive Officer and applying it, untested, to all business leaders, simply because they seem to be different from "us"? (And isn't this even a bit unethical?)

Now a further objection, of course, can be raised. One may grant that an individual businessperson may be very moral and care a great deal about the social good, but then go on to argue that the structure of businesses will either extinguish that impulse (perhaps by causing that person to be fired for poor profit-making performance) or make it ineffective (through procedural or groupthink factors)—because, of course, firms must maximize profits.

Businesses

The belief that firms are mechanical profit-maximizers can be hard to overcome. Many believe, for example, that profit maximization is mandated by law. But an actual examination of the relevant legal codes and case law shows that this is not so. The codes say that the purpose of a business is to run a business—profit is generally not even mentioned.7 Many state legal codes explicitly state that the interests of stakeholder groups such as employees and customers, long-term interests, and the interests of the larger community, can all be legitimately be taken into account in business decisions (Adams and Matheson 2000). And the belief that an directors or executives will be hauled into court if they act on any goals other than profit maximization is quite exaggerated. It is actually quite difficult to remove an officer through legal action (Smith 1998).

Likewise, the idea that executives will automatically be sacked if they do not profit-maximize gets more credence than it deserves. The current business news is, for example, full of cases of financial industry CEOs who are being kept on—and even getting multi-million dollar bonuses—after leading their organizations into ruin. Now, it may not be clear why this is an argument against the "profit maximization" dogma, since in many people's minds the phrases "profit maximization" and "greedy CEOs" seem to point to the same phenomenon. In actuality, though, there is a critically important difference.

Firms are complexly structured social organizations. The owners of a firm, which in the case of a corporation are its shareholders, are in principle the recipients of the firm's profits. Profits are what is left over after all revenues are gathered in, and all necessary expenses are paid, and the shareholders are supposed to receive them through payments of dividends or through increases in the value of their shares. A corporation has a Board of Directors which is supposed to oversea the management of the firm, and the board in turn hires (and approves the compensation packages for) the top executives who handle the firm's day-to-day operations. So "profit maximization" or "creating value for the shareholders" should mean not paying any more than is strictly necessary to get managerial talent—that is, should require keeping a lid on CEO salaries. Shareholders are among the people most outraged by the skyrocketing executive compensation packages of recent decades, as articles in magazines such as Fortune attest (Kirkland 2006).

Ironically, the CEO compensation fiasco has developed, in good part, as a direct result of theories based on "economic man." Not being able to believe that anyone would have sufficient incentive to run an business in the interest of shareholders (and/or employees, customers, the community, society, etc.) for a mere fair and reasonable salary, neoclassical economists suggested giving CEOs stock options and bonuses based on performance. This means that CEO compensation goes up when the price of company shares go up or certain other goals are achieved. In theory, then, their pecuniary interests and the shareholders' pecuniary interests would become aligned. But if people are opportunistic enough to care only about their own compensation and not about their company, they are also opportunistic enough to figure out how to game this system. And a number have, aiming to maintain a short-term illusion of profitability just long enough to cash in their options, or sitting as directors on each others boards and voting each other big bonuses based on meeting routine goals. Others—less opportunistic—have resisted the call.

There are many reasons to believe, right now, that many businesses are ethically broken, and that substantial changes are needed in firm structure, governance (e.g. the composition and duties of the Boards), and regulation to get businesses back on track. But the reason firms are ethically broken is not because they automatically "profit maximize." They don't. Instead, the belief in "economic man" and narrow goals has itself served, over time, to corrupt earlier notions of business responsibility, in a sort of self- fulfilling prophecy.

A firm is not made up of one individual, with one goal. Rather, it is made up of executives, managers, and workers engaged in a joint activity, embedded in relations with suppliers, customers, shareholders, creditors, communities, governments, the natural environment, and so on. The fields of business management, organizational behavior, and economic sociology would have far less work to do, of course, if businesses were as simple as conventional economics assumes them to be. Business ethicists have plenty of work cut out for them in investigating how businesses can best be structured to carry out their social and environmental responsibilities (Paine 2002). Neoclassical economic dogmas, however, should not be allowed to stand in the way.

Of course, it may be granted that individual people and individual firms may be essentially human and social, but then argued that the market is the ultimate impersonal mechanism.

Markets

Don't the forces of market competition demand that firms squeeze out every last penny of profit, or they will go out of business? Doesn’t market competition, in itself, reinforce dog-eat-dog competition, values of greed and self-interest, and a race to the bottom on social and environmental protections? There are two flaws in this argument.

First, markets are not, in fact, nearly as competitive as portrayed in the abstract, mechanical model. Wal-Mart, ExxonMobil, IBM, Verizon, Microsoft, and the like are hardly the sort of anonymous, powerless companies that populate the neoclassical theory of perfect competition. The economic conditions they face do not dictate their decisions to them: They normally operate with some “slack”—that is, some excess of revenues over strictly necessary expenses. This slack gives them some room for discretion. They may, as discussed above, pay outlandish salaries to their CEOs—or build sumptuous headquarters, or go on acquisitions binges, or pour money into political campaigns. Or they may raise the wages of their lowest-paid workers, "green" their company, start a company day care center, or invest in impoverished communities. Some of these positive sorts of actions may also, of course, be profitable, but the point here is that with some "slack," they could also be accomplished even if they are only neutral or somewhat costly. Since many businesses are not on a razor's edge of competition, their decisions can be made with some discretion. This opens the possibility of realizing that business practices are complex and laden with ethical possibilities and ramifications.

Second, the idea that markets are somehow mechanical also assumes that "the market" somehow exists "it itself," separable from society and government, and separable from more cooperative social values such as trust and cooperation. Considered from a different point of view, market interactions can be seen to be entirely dependent on values of trust and cooperation, systems of social mores, and government laws and regulations. Neoclassical economists imagine that perfectly competitive markets can run well "on their own" because of subsidiary (and often well-hidden) assumptions that actors are perfectly rational, perfectly informed, have perfect foresight about the future, and trade all goods that are relevant for well being. In the real world, in contrast, there are in fact symbiotic relationships between social values and market values, and between governmental activity and market activity.

In order for a trade to take place, for example, the trading partners have to trust each other—that is, trust that the items being exchanged have the value that is claimed for them. Because actors in real life do not possess "perfect information," this requires ethical norms of honesty, backed up by social institutions such as business reputations, ratings bureaus, government regulations concerning disclosure or product quality, and the courts. Market exchange also requires a physical environment that is not unduly polluted or depleted, again requiring coordinated social and political action. The more honest and considerate trading partners are—the more they see their exchange as a cooperative endeavor to benefit both parties and society, rather than a selfish grab—the more smoothly markets can run. Were people to generally display no concern for social cohesion, ethics, or responsibility, and display pure opportunism at every turn, then every economic transaction would need to be tightly policed...and then someone would have to police those doing this policing, and on ad infinitum.

Take away a concern for ethics, and leave markets to "self-regulate," and the result is a train wreck—as we have learned from the 2008-2009 (and ongoing) financial crisis. Everyone from mortgage brokers to lending institutions to rating agencies followed the neoclassical advice to pursue self-interest, and the result was not market bliss, but market disaster. And while neoclassical economics says that agents are autonomous and rational in their decision-making, the financial crisis has yielded plenty of evidence to the contrary. Asset markets, including markets for housing and financial instruments, are very sensitive to social beliefs about the value of the asset involved.8 People will often buy an asset based not on some rational calculation of its fundamental worth, but because they have confidence that other people believe that the asset is valuable. As the field of behavioral finance investigates, such herd behavior, along with emotional responses such as excitement and overweening optimism, are key elements in the formation of speculative bubbles such as the one we witnessed in the U.S. housing market.

Market behavior, then, is not something separate from the social behavior of emotional, embodied, interconnected human beings, but simply another variant of it. Ethical approaches, and coordinated, community or governmental forms of management relevant for other aspects of social life are equally relevant to economic life.

#### Purely anti-market politics abandons billions to the neoliberal version of economics. Being left outside of exchange is even worse than exploitation.

Alessandro **FERRARA** History, Humanity, and Society @ University of Rome Tor Vergata ‘**17** in *Feminism, Capitalism, and Critique* eds. Bottici & Bargu p. 177-178

Distinctive of Fraser’s triple movement is the fact that, while the Polanyian picture presupposed a zero-sum opposition between disembedment and social protection, now each polarity of the triad relates to each of the other two, thereby affecting also the relation of each of the Polanyian antagonist elements to one another. As the trajectory of feminism illustrates, movements that oppose patriarchal domination inscribed in the patterns of social protection may end up undermining forms of ethical solidarity, “thereby clearing a path for marketization” (ibid, p. 129) More generally, movements that target traditional structures of domination buttressed by thick ethical conceptions may either erode or transform such ethical background, thereby either jeopardizing or emancipating the forms of social protection.

Here is the crucial point of Fraser’s Zeitdiagnose: a “dangerous liaison” has been forming in recent years between social movements which, in their struggle against patriarchal, generational, colonial, racial structures of authority, considered certain “difference-friendly,” “creativity- encouraging” forms of neoliberal capitalism, along with the kind of neoliberal enterprises that, “styling themselves as an insurrection, . .. adopt the accents of emancipation to excoriate social protection as a fetter on freedom,” as a natural ally (ibid, p. 130). Fraser’s account of this dangerous liaison is not meant to replace entirely the three previous explanations for the blocked dynamic of protection, but rather to help us understand “the grammars of claims-making and social imaginaries that mediate the responses of political actors to their situation” (ibid, p. 131), the reason for the current demoralization of the social-democratic elites and the enduring aura of innovativeness that surrounds neoliberal capitalism despite the 2008 debacle. Her account also alerts us to the complications inherent in the new tripolar dynamics set forth by disembedded financialized capitalism. Neither protection nor emancipation have remained the same, according to Fraser:

An emancipatory project coloured by naive faith in contract, meritocracy and individual advancement will easily be twisted to other ends - as has been the case in the present era. However, an emancipatory project wedded to the wholesale rejection of markets effectively cedes indispensable liberal ideals to free marketeers, while abandoning the billions across the globe who rightly understand that there is something worse than being exploited - namely, being counted as not worth exploiting. In general, then, no emancipation without some new synthesis of marketization and social protection, (ibid, p. 131-2)

In positive terms, according to Fraser, a suitable project for emancipation would not reject Polanyi’s insights but build on them, would sever the liaison with neoliberalism, and would encourage “forging a principled new alliance with social protection,” while at the same time rescuing an “equally valid interest in solidarity” and reclaiming “the indispensable interest in negative liberty from the neoliberal uses to which it has been bent” (ibid., p. 132).

#### We should reject the binary treatment of care and competition. The military-industrial complex exemplifies the corruption of cooperation, not competition. This turns the case.

Julie **NELSON** Global Development and Environment @ Tufts **’10** “Care Ethics and Markets: A View from Feminist Economics” GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT AND ENVIRONMENT INSTITUTE WORKING PAPER NO. 10-02 p. 15-16

Competition and Cooperation

In order to keep this in mind, it may be helpful to deconstruct dichotomous thinking about competition versus cooperation. Competition refers to trying to do as well as or better at something than someone else, while cooperation refers to coordinating activities with someone else in a joint effort. The usual view is that one precludes the other, and that market-oriented capitalism is all about competition. Instead, thinking about them as complementary phenomena that each have both positive and negative aspects, may be more helpful, as illustrated in Figure 4.

Table

Description automatically generated

Competition can have positive aspects because—as economists are right to point out—it can give people incentives to be creative, hard-working, and look for ways to produce things more cheaply. Of course, the form of the competition makes a big difference. Innovation in the form of creating a new cure for disease can increase human welfare, while innovation in the form of new opaque and deceptive financial instruments decreases it. Cutting costs through increased energy efficiency is generally a good thing, while cutting them by cutting the wages of the poorest workers in a "race to the bottom" is not. But what this leads back to is exactly the point that ethics—ethics of honesty, and ethics of caring about the wellbeing of flesh-and-blood human beings—cannot be avoided in economic life. Competition is not "structurally," by its nature, good or bad: It is good or bad as we make it.

While cooperation tends to carry positive connotations of harmony and helpfulness in working for the social good, it is important to note that cooperation can also have bad consequences. In economic life, it can take the form of collusion and exclusive deals among companies, which are the very things that undermine the healthy aspects of market competition. Too-close cooperation between businesses and government gives us the military-industrial complex, as well as Congressional actions that exclusively serve Wall Street constituencies. As in life in general, when "the social good" is defined over too narrow a social group, cooperation means the solidarity of "insider" groups who may serve themselves at the expense of "outsider" groups. Feminist and civil rights activists had to struggle for decades, for example, to crack the highly cooperative white-male-solidarity behaviors that prevailed among employers and union leaders, in order to allow women and minorities the chance to compete for jobs.

The positive complementarity between competition and cooperation arises because, as pointed out above, a spirit of cooperation between buyers and sellers, and between businesses and governments, is just as necessary as competition for successful market functioning. But neither competition nor cooperation on its own, or any naïve mix of the two, is "structurally" good. The devil is in the details, and only specific, applied ethical evaluation can help us judge economic phenomena as more or less worthy of approbation.

#### Pragmatic economic decision-making should be privileged over radical purism – adapting welfare state institutions key to any rhetorically viable radical economic project.

Julie **NELSON** Global Development and Environment @ Tufts **‘6** *Economics for Humans* p. 124-127

A Way Forward

I don’t expect mainstream scholars in the social sciences and philosophy to lead the way toward a more adequate understanding of the relations among economics, ethics, and care. Academe just has too much inertia. While I’d love to have it otherwise, I strongly suspect that ten years from now many beginning economics students will still be taught that the economy is a wonderful machine.5 I suspect that many beginning sociology or philosophy students will still be instilled with a fear of the presumably inherently dehumanizing effects of monetized exchange.6 Instead, I believe that it will be people on the ground, working in business management or doing the work of care, who will be most helpful in breaking down the petrified eighteenth- century image of the economic machine. I hope that, over time, more scholars and popular writers will support the project, shifting public opinion toward a new and more responsible view.

A lesson from history may be useful here, too. In the late 18 oos, at the start of the Progressive Era in U. S. politics, the battle lines seemed clearly drawn. On the one hand, the “robber barons” of capitalism—the owners of big steel, big oil, and the like—built huge fortunes in the unregulated, free-wheeling capitalist markets of the time. Meanwhile, the industrial workers-—some of them children—worked fourteen to sixteen hours a day in unhealthy, oppressive conditions. It would seem that the workers would be poised to respond to the Marxist call, “workers of the world, unite!” Yet the guiding philosophy of the Progressive Era was that the interests of capital and labor did not have to be seen as strictly opposed. We owe many things we take for granted today, such as labor laws, regulations on financial markets, programs such as Social Security and unemployment insurance, and food and drug inspections to innovations made during that era.The programs themselves were generally designed using input from all the interested parties. Commissions including representatives from industry, labor, consumer groups, and government agencies were set up to work out solutions to the worst problems afflicting the industrial economy of the time.

Institutional economists, of whom the most famous was John R. Commons of the University of Wisconsin, played a role in spreading this pragmatic approach in the early decades of the twentieth century. Commons and his colleagues were not guided by any grand theory that gave them answers in advance of actual investigations. Their methods relied heavily on looking at the specific nature of particular industries and problems, gathering information on what sorts of solutions had been tried elsewhere, and seeking the input of concerned parties. Not surprisingly, such a pragmatic approach was looked at suspiciously by mechanically minded purists on both sides. On one side, radical Marxists objected that it merely made an inherently oppressive system a little more bearable by throwing more crumbs to the workers. On the other side, champions of capitalist wealth creation grumbled that the government “interference” created by Progressive policies put an unnecessary drag on free-market forces.

Now, in the early twenty-first century, it is time to retrench. Some of the old Progressive policies, designed for the industries and families of their era, don’t fit our situation so well anymore. We need new social responses to deal with new issues. Ecological issues weren’t on the radar screen yet, back then. Care was assigned, unpaid, to women in the home when the Progressives designed their policies. But right-wing purists are now threatening to roll back many of the Progressive Era programs entirely and put nothing in their place.They spout ideologically inspired neoliberal, promarket policies that prescribe deregulation and privatization in all spheres. Marxism has meanwhile all but lost its teeth as a critique of this, as disappointing results in communist countries have made radical theory a mostly academic exercise. While the policies created by the old Progressives are no longer entirely adequate for today’s society and economy, I think we can learn a great deal from their methods. “What are the greatest causes of harm in today’s society?” and “How can we work together to correct them?” are the right questions to ask. The response to one kind of mechanical purism need not be the opposite variety of mechanical purism. We can recognize that the health of living, vital economies depends on our ethical decision making and our willingness to support relationships of care and respect. If we want a world of social justice, ecological sustainability, and care for those who need it, I hope we will, like the Progressives of old, put our efforts toward the pragmatic and challenging project of making real-world economies work for human benefit. Our bodies and souls depend on it.

#### Pursuit of antimarket purity dooms alternative to irrelevancy – alienates potential allies and assumes non-market economics wouldn’t oppress.

Julie **NELSON** Global Development and Environment @ Tufts **‘6** *Economics for Humans* p. 37-40

Problems with the Market-Critic Prescriptions

At the end of the last chapter, I brought up evidence of poverty and corporate abuses that raise questions about the adequacy of the probusiness, free-market prescription for curing social ills. Do the prescriptions of the market critics for “small is beautiful/’“government to the rescue,” or “separate spheres” solutions give us grounds for more hope?

The “small is beautiful” prescription contains, of course, some truth. It is true that acting ethically is a more complicated process the larger and more complex the level of organization involved. Likewise, the “government to the rescue” advocates make some good points. It is easier for any one company to do the right thing if there is public pressure on all companies to do the right thing, and a government regulation can be a good tool for applying such pressure. On an even larger scale, international public agreements may be the only hope for addressing global climate change issues. These are far too big for any one nation, let alone one company, to take on. And there is some truth in the “separate spheres” view. There are some social welfare problems for which private, market solutions don’t work. Care for people who are poor and ill or otherwise needy cannot be provided on a purely market basis. The funds have to come from somewhere other than the “consumers” of the services. Public or private nonprofit allocations of money are necessary.

But while the values held in high regard by market critics are praiseworthy, and the prescriptions contain partial truths, I find the prescribed solutions lacking when held up to criteria of realism and effectiveness. Sometimes the proposed solutions could cause real damage.

A first problem is that these views tend to assume not only that the market sphere is driven exclusively by self-interest, but that self-interest is exclusive to the market sphere. They often seem to assume that if an organization is small, or nonprofit, or governmental, then non-self-interested motivations can be trusted to take over. We should consider the evidence on this.

Families, for example, are very small nonprofit organizations, presumably governed by interests of love and intimacy (as in the Victorian image).The newspaper reminds us daily, however, that families can also be characterized by domination and abuse, even violence. Sometimes being in a small-scale organization just means being under the thumb of a small-scale oppressor.

Community organizing is a great way to bring a group together to work on issues of social concern and to create opportunities for activism. Community organizing was very effective in South Boston in the 1970s, for instance, when big community demonstrations were organized to fight racial integration of the local public schools. Sometimes community groups carry out agendas of racism. And it is not uncommon for community activists motivated by not-in-my-backyard sentiments to try to push undesirable projects off on some other community. Communities, like individuals, can act in purely self-interested ways.

Nonprofit and religious organizations can bring people together to work for goals other than profit.The Boston diocese of the Catholic Church, for example, is legally not allowed to be motivated by profit. It was the maintenance of its own institutional hierarchies and reputation that motivated it to quietly move priests who sexually abused children from one parish to another, thereby supplying the abusers with fresh victims. Nonprofit institutions—even those ostensibly concerned with maintaining moral and spiritual values—are not immune to evil.

In an era of suspicious elections, campaign finance fiascos, and powerful lobbyists, one has to be naive in the extreme to believe that governments can be trusted to automatically or naturally work for the common good.

Appeals to small communities, nonprofits, or governments to take over economic activities “in the public interest” seem to me to bring in a deus ex machina solution.Yes, it would be nice if it worked. But how do we know that those selfish motivations critics assume drive the market are not also going to show up in families, community organizations, nonprofits, and the state?

A second problem with these views is that they largely pull the rug out from under their own noble drives. Because money and power are associated with greed and oppression, money and power are treated as inherently morally suspect. People who possess these, such as corporate executives who might be willing to engage in ethical discussion (if given the chance), are labeled as the evil “them,” separated by a large gulf from the moral “us.” Thus, potential allies and power bases are eliminated. This aversion to money and power has, I believe, been especially damaging to the sectors of the economy in which hands-on care is provided to children, the sick, and the elderly. Remember this poster: “It will be a great day when the schools have all the money they need and the air force has to hold a bake sale to buy a bomber”? How true. But the antimoney ideology reinforces exactly the bake-sale, nickel-and-dime mentality for human services that that poster decried. The damage this attitude has inflicted on caring work will be taken up further when I look at issues of money and motivations in chapter 4. A third problem is that, even if the prescriptions given by market critics were viable once put in place, there would still remain the problem of getting there. The massive promarket tide now flooding the United States and global institutions presents an intimidating reality check. The “small is beautiful” view tells us that we must have a massive economic restructuring— the thorough destruction of large corporations as a form of economic organization—before we can really be human in our economic lives. This would require a gargantuan change— larger, perhaps, than the Industrial Revolution and the rise and fall of Communism combined. If, on the other hand, we hope to be rescued by the rise of powerful, purely public-spirited interventionist governments, the current political climate makes it look like we may be waiting a very long time. Every step toward wresting control away from those with money and power will, market critics correctly perceive, be resisted by those with money and power.

Some people enjoy tilting at the economic machine—or at windmills, like Don Quixote in his hopeless crusades. In fact, I admire the spirit of people who keep to their praiseworthy, treasured values against all odds. But what if the futures envisioned by market critics, visions that tend to seesaw between the utopian and apocalyptic, are not the only options? What if the proposed solutions are unsatisfactory because the market critics have, unfortunately, combined good values with erroneous “facts” about what an economy is?

## Case

### 1NC – AT: Case

#### Vote neg on presumption:

#### If they don’t defend the material elimination of antitrust policy, they can’t solve their Ks of markets. They can’t have their cake and eat it too- they must either defend the end of capitalism and antitrust law to solve their aff, or you should assume their Ks of antitrust and capitalism are irresolvable and inevitable.

#### If their theory of counterinsurgency is *true,* then mutual aid is woefully insufficient! They’ve said counterinsurgency ensures that EVERYTHING can be anticipated, including resistance! The aff has basically read the perm doublebind against themselves. They are missing an internal link that explains how affirming care work results in eliminating counterinsurgent forces like the military and police. This means mutual aid efforts will be crushed.

#### Care work fails:

#### Organizers face immense bureaucratic roadblocks and policing.

Ikoro 21

(Chima Ikoro is the community organizing editor at the Weekly. 8-18-21, Mutual Aid Projects May Soon Run up Against Bureaucratic Barriers, Southside Weekly, <https://southsideweekly.com/mutual-aid-projects-may-soon-run-up-against-bureaucratic-barriers/>, JKS)

On its face, mutual aid would seem to have no downside, but as organizers have learned, there are hidden roadblocks that make the work hard. In some cases, groups that have provided free assistance to community members have even been criminalized by the police. In one example, police and City inspectors served the Chicago Freedom School (CFS) with a cease-and-desist order last year for providing food to protestors after they became trapped downtown following the George Floyd protests in the Loop on May 30, 2020. Inspectors claimed that by distributing food, CFS was in violation of their business license. Although the City settled and eventually agreed to rescind the cease-and-desist order, this act was still a violent and egregious effort to stop community members from simply helping each other. In 2019, the National Law Center on Homelessness and Poverty released an annual report that detailed, among other things, changes in restrictions on food sharing. This report stated that although homelessness is on the rise, more and more cities are creating laws that discourage food sharing. In 2018, twelve people were charged with misdemeanors for distributing food to houseless people in El Cajon, California. A municipal code in El Cajon prohibits food sharing in public places. The year prior, seven people were arrested in Tampa, Florida for similar charges, and a woman was ticketed for feeding houseless persons in Atlanta later that year. If criminalizing the sharing of food didn’t pose a high-enough hurdle for organizers, redistributing funds has its own set of complications as well. If an ad hoc mutual aid group is not registered as a 501(c)(3) nonprofit through the IRS the individual(s) of record receiving the funds (through Venmo, Paypal, or some other means) are liable to be taxed for money received as donations. The process to complete the paperwork and meet the requirements can be tedious and riddled with caveats. According to the IRS, an organization that is tax-exempt as a 501(c)(3) cannot be an “action organization.” In other words, supporting or influencing policy changes and legislation, as well as supporting or rejecting political candidates, cannot be a part of such an organization’s work. This would seem to pose a potential problem for many politically engaged mutual aid projects. But the process of obtaining 501(c)(3) status can be more laborious than upholding its rules. Femdot, a rapper from north Chicago and the south suburbs, is the founder and director of operations for Delacreme Scholars, a nonprofit organization.

#### Mutual aid is insufficient to address the scale of communal needs. The history of labor movements proves there’s a direct tradeoff between community care and pushing for universal state programs.

Wuest 20

(Joanna Wuest holds the Fund for Reunion–Cotsen Postdoctoral Fellowship in LGBT Studies and is a lecturer at Princeton University. 12-16-20, Mutual Aid Can’t Do It Alone, The Nation, <https://www.thenation.com/article/society/mutual-aid-pandemic-covid/>, JKS)

This all set the stage for the New Left’s intense suspicions of the state—and a pivot to practices of community care. The Black Panther Party for Self-Defense was an exemplar of this tradition. Cofounders Huey P. Newton and Bobby Seale grounded the party’s work in nearly two dozen service-to-the-people survival programs, the corollary of a broader agenda to educate, organize, and foment revolutionary activity. As Newton recounted, such programs were meant to illuminate capitalism’s inability to fulfill the people’s daily needs. One of the most effective of these projects was the Free for Children breakfast program. Within a year of its launch in 1969, the Panthers had fed over 20,000 youths in 19 cities. The program was so successful that it was mimicked by California Governor Ronald Reagan, who expanded the state’s nutrition assistance programs to counter the Black Panthers’ influence. The Panthers’ free breakfast brigade is still remembered fondly; this year Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez of New York recalled its legacy, comparing her office’s Covid-19 relief outreach to the breakfast program. But admirers of the Panthers often overstate the impact of their undeniably noble work. Despite her claim that the Panthers pressured the federal government to authorize a free breakfast program in 1975, the Department of Agriculture’s Food and Nutrition Service rolled out the first of several pilot programs three years before the Panthers’. (It was made permanent in the year Ocasio-Cortez cited.) Since 1946, the department has been offering its free and reduced-price National School Lunch program, a replacement for a patchwork array of volunteer ventures. Still, much more important than debates over which came first are the issues of scale and routes toward systemic reform. While the Panthers fed an astounding number of children across an impressive geographic range, their 1969 record was dwarfed by the more than 500,000 kids the federal government served free and reduced-price breakfasts the following year. (The program currently feeds 14 million children.) Compared with the suite of aid programs launched by the Great Society and the War on Poverty, the Panthers’ service-to-the-people projects were a drop in the bucket. But scale wasn’t their only goal. Unlike organizers of the March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom like A. Philip Randolph and Bayard Rustin—who conjoined labor, civil rights, and demands for a federal minimum wage and jobs program—the Panthers were interested in building dual power institutions that would one day compete with the state. As party member Lorenzo Kom’boa Ervin explained, their aim was to bypass the state by building “our communities into dual power communes, from which we can wage a protracted struggle with capitalism and its agents.” But as the Panthers’ influence waned, an increasing number of self-styled community leaders became integrated into a political and entrepreneurial elite that largely neglected policies that would materially benefit the working-class Black population. Some would even come to assist a revanchist capitalist class in pillaging the welfare state and breaking the back of labor. There is a striking parallel between these developments and the trajectory of 19th century ethnically organized mutual aid outfits and related small-business ventures, which just as often evolved into capitalist enterprises and municipal political machines as they did vehicles for reform. And while a handful of those groups paved the way for strong unions and welfare policies, Black power came onto the scene at a time when the American left was enervated and there were few similar opportunities for egalitarian influence. A left-wing politics of mutual aid and self-care gave way to accommodation and brokerage. By the late 20th century, liberals pushed for a more limited deployment of the state, inaugurating the practice of leasing out state functions to private entities like nonprofits. By the late 1970s, an all-out assault on labor and the welfare state began to roll back 20th-century workers’ wins. As the United States went into lockdown last spring, the country entered a pandemic-induced recession with scant social protections. Faced with a hollowed-out welfare state and inadequate relief from the federal government’s initial stimulus, Americans had no choice but to rely on the generosity of their neighbors, friends, and colleagues. Since March, people from weekend volunteers to full-time anarchists have done extraordinary things to distribute food staples and provide shelter for those who found themselves hungry and homeless. Still, given that nearly a quarter of American households with children are carrying rental debt and that a permanent exodus of the poor and working class from major urban hubs is underway, such efforts are confined mainly to the margins. Weathering the current crisis requires nurturing useful hope while avoiding palliative delusions. That means ditching our magical thinking about the sustainability of those mass mobilizations of goodwill that make the nightly news and pepper the pages of left-wing periodicals (both of which neglect the fact that charitable giving actually plummets during recessions). It also means recognizing that crises are excellent opportunities for revanchist right-wing forces to further raze state institutions and slam the lid on cries for justice. When labor-left movements were strong and could afford to go on the offense, the Great Depression created an opening for reform. If there is a lesson from mutual aid’s role in these past triumphs, it is that such community work was subordinated to the tasks of invigorating trade unions and pushing the state to enact universal programs. Kropotkin was not wrong about our natural inclination to cooperate. But how we organize and nurture that cooperative instinct is crucial. A crisis can bring us together to rebuild durable structures for the collective good. It can also exacerbate the dog-eat-dog mentality that neoliberalism has cultivated for decades. Our country is coming to resemble a long-sought libertarian fantasy, with only atomized acts of compassion for those left out. We would do well to guard against this despotic individualism—the natural condition of the social without the state—and to be sober about what spurred this renaissance of mutual aid and what it portends.

#### It reinforces existing inequalities.

McCarthy, PhD, 5 (James, Geography @ PSU, “Commons as counterhegemonic projects” *Capitalism, Nature, Socialism* 16 (1) p. INFORMA)

Global commons can also be profoundly undemocratic and reinforce existing inequalities, however. To assert a commons at one scale is almost necessarily to deny claims at another. For example, to claim as the 'common heritage of mankind' something as aggregated and reified as 'biodiversity'41 is to stake a claim to resources in other sovereign territories and to override many national or indigenous claims, usually without consultation with or benefit to those most affected. Global 'commons' of this sort, even if redistributive in initial intent (as efforts to claim deep seabed mineral resources as the 'common heritage of mankind' were), have the potential to reinforce and perpetuate existing global inequalities, in part because they lack defining attributes of commons, such as genuine participation in decision-making by all or most members of the community in question and relative equity among the 'commoners.' So, new commons do not always mean greater democracy or sensitivity towards alternative property regimes. Such considerations highlight the importance of Klein's insistence on local diversity and autonomy: while she advocates a global reclaiming of commons, it is not at all clear that she advocates global commons in the end; rather, she seems convinced that the many local calls for commons she catalogues share a common political impulse and point the way towards a new kind of left politics. Finally, while she is explicitly anti-capitalist and certainly accords no deference to the market, her conviction that the local is necessarily more democratic and sustainable than the national seems to me based more on ideology than on evidence. I would argue that her vision of commons might benefit from a direct, robust engagement with arguments that the state, for all its flaws, remains the most democratic and democratizable of modern institutions.

#### No political will.

Milanovic 21 -- visiting presidential professor at the Graduate Center of the City University of New York and an affiliated senior scholar at the Luxembourg Income Study. (Branko,"Degrowth: solving the impasse by magical thinking ," Substack, <https://branko2f7.substack.com/p/degrowth-solving-the-impasse-by-magical?r=16uxt&amp;utm_campaign=post&amp;utm_medium=web&amp;utm_source=twitter> Jun 27 2021)//gcd \*edited

Now degrowers are not irrational people. The reason why they are pushed in this magical corner is because when they try to “do the numbers” they are led to an impasse. They do not want to allow for significant increase in world GDP because it will, even if decoupling (of which they are skeptical) happens, drive energy emissions too high. If one wants to keep world GDP more or less as now one must (A) “freeze” today’s global income distributions so that some 10-15% of the world population continue to live below the absolute poverty line, and one-half of the world population below $PPP 7 dollars per day (which is, by the way, significantly below Western poverty lines). This is however unacceptable to the poor people, to the poor countries, and even to degrowers themselves.

Thus they must try something else: introduce a different distribution (B) where everybody who is above the current mean world income ($PPP 16  per day) is driven down to this mean, and the poor countries and people are,  at least for a while, allowed to continue growing until they too achieve the level of $PPP 16 per day. But the problem with that approach is that one would have to engage in a massive reduction of incomes for all those who make more than $PPP 16 which is practically all of the Western population. Only 14% of the population in Western countries live at the level of income less than the global mean. This is probably the most important statistic that one should keep in mind. Degrowers thus need to convince 86% of the population living in rich countries that their incomes are too high and need to be reduced. They would have to preside over economic depressions for about a decade, and then let the new real income stay at that level indefinitely. (Even that would not quite solve the problem because in the meantime, many poor countries would have reached the level of $PPP 16 per day and they too would  have to be prevented from growing further.) It is quite obvious that such a proposition is a ~~political suicide~~[politically unviable] Thus degrowers do not wish to spell it out.

They are  brought to an impasse. They cannot condemn to perpetual poverty people in developing countries who are just seeing the glimpses of a better life, nor can they reasonably argue that incomes of 9 out of 10 Westerners ought to be reduced.

The way out of the impasse is to engage in semi-magical and then outright magical thinking.

Semi-magical thinking (that is, thinking where the objective—however laudable- is not linked with any tools of achieving it) is to argue that GDP is not a correct measure of welfare, or that better outcomes in certain dimensions can be achieved by countries or peoples with a lower GDP (or lower incomes). Both propositions are correct.

GDP does leave out non-commercialized activities that are welfare-enhancing. It is,  like every other measure, imperfect and one-dimensional.  But if it is imperfect at the edges while fairly accurate overall. Richer countries are countries that are generally better-off in almost all metrics, from education, life expectancy, child mortality to women’s employment etc. Not only that: richer people are also on average healthier, better educated, and happier. Income indeed buys you health and happiness. (It does not guarantee that you are a better person; but that’s a different topic.)  The metric of income or GDP is strongly associated with positive outcomes, whether we compare countries to each other, or people (within a country) to each other. This is something so obvious that it is bizarre that one needs to restate it: people migrate from Morocco to France  because France is a richer country and they will be better-off there. American Blacks are worse off than American Whites in all dimensions, not least in terms of their income. This is the background to the Black Lives Matter movement that wants to make Blacks better off and equal in income and health to Whites.

Since this fails, the next approach taken by degrowers consists in pulling out individual cases of countries the have performed exceptionally well on some metrics (like Cuba on health) and those that have performed exceptionally badly (like US on life expectancy) and to argue that a certain desirable outcome can be achieved with much less money. It is indeed true that some countries or some people, despite their lack of income, have achieved excellent things while others have used their income inefficiently or wastefully. But it does not follow from such individual examples that they overturn the regularities described In the previous paragraph. What degrowers do is to first metaphorically run a regression of a desirable outcome on GDP or income, and when they observe that the two are closely correlated, forget about the regression, pull out an outlier, and claim that the outlier shows that the relationship does not exist.

That is clearly wrong too. So the next stage in semi-magical thinking consists in trying to convince people that they are wrongly pursing the Golden Calf of wealth and that much more modest lives would be better, or at least are feasible. To that effect they use baskets of goods and services that allow “modest” standard of living and satisfy all basic needs. But they fail to show us how such “modest needs” are to be implemented: how will people be obliged to consume only so much and not more? In war situations, this is done through rationing. Indeed, one could ration the number of square meters of textile that each household may be able to buy, introduce meat and gasoline coupons and so forth. It has been done many times. But degrowers know that a wartime economy in the peacetime would not be politically acceptable, so they just do the basket calculation, show that it is compatible with “planetary boundaries”, and leave it at that. How we are going to have that basket accepted by people, or implemented despite their will, is not something they desire to be disturbed with.

#### No blueprint.

Andrew **SAYER** Reader in Political Economy @ Lancaster **’95** *Radical Political Economy: A Critique* p. 7-8

Radical political economy is of course a critical social science, both explaining and criticizing the practices it studies, with the explicit aim of reducing illusion and freeing people from domination and unwanted forces. But it can only hope to have an emancipatory effect if it considers its own critical standpoints and the alternative social arrangements they imply. Unfortunately it rarely does this, with the result that its stand- points and implicit alternatives are often contradictory, infeasible, or undesirable even if they are feasible. Marxist-influenced work still bears the traces of the tension between the standpoints of a socialist or communist society which has pre-industrial communitarian qualities and one in which the forces of production are developed beyond current levels of industrialization. More generally, there is a strong modernist tendency in which it is assumed that problems can be progressively unravelled without creating new ones at the same time, as if eventually all trade-offs or dilemmas could be overcome through a triumph of reason. We shall argue through substantive examples that such optimism is not only misplaced but likely to be counterproductive, limiting progress. There are always likely to be 'dilemmas of development' (Toye, 1987. The problem of critical standpoints has become more acute in recent years, indeed it is central to the crisis of the Left. There is no longer asingle standpoint or alternative (socialism/communism) counterposed to a single, overarching target (capitalism). Now there are many targets -patriarchy, racism, homophobia, militarism, industrialism - and corre- spondingly many critical standpoints with complex relations between them. That critical social science is no longer seen as synonymous with a socialist perspective is a sign of considerable progress, and cause for optimism too, as failure on the traditional front of class politics is compensated by progress on other, newer fronts such as the politics of gender. But it is also a source of heightened uncertainty. While there was always a problem of inconsistencies between critical standpoints, it has deepened and widened with the rise of 'green' concerns, for they bring into question the feasibility and desirability of non-capitalist as well as capitalist industrial societies. Is the problem capitalism, industrial society in general, or modernity?; and what are the alterna- tives? Equally, increasing awareness of problems of ethnocentrism and value pluralism throws doubt over the familiar, implicit critical stand- points of Western radical social science. How do we decide what is a problem? What if we cannot reach a consensus on this? Until recently, it seemed that the problems or targets of critical social science could be relied upon to emerge from the investigation of existing practices, where one would encounter the felt needs, frustrations and suffering of actors, and in discovering the sources of these problems, work out what changes would lead towards emancipation (e.g. Fay, 1975, 1987; Collier, 1994h(. This was coupled with an implicit view that emancipation was a form of escape from domination, illusion and unwanted constraints, with little or no acknowledgement that it depended on the construction of superior, alternative, progressive frameworks which could replace the old ones. But it is now increasingly apparent that normative questions of possible alternatives and what is good or bad about them cannot be evaded. How, without addressing such questions, could one decide what constitutes a superior alternative? Should there be a presumption in favour of community as a basis of social organiz- ation over other forms? Does liberalism provide the best framework for multicultural societies? What should be people's rights and responsibili- ties? What are our responsibilities to distant others, future generations, and to other species? There is little hope of achieving the goal of an emancipatory social science if it shuns normative discussions of issues such as these.

#### Cant create a new division of labor.

McCarthy, PhD, 5 (James, Geography @ PSU, “Commons as counterhegemonic projects” *Capitalism, Nature, Socialism* 16 (1) p. INFORMA)

Donahue's local commons are the most clear-cut in terms of both scale and membership. He advocates commons at the scale of towns, with town residents as the commoners. He considers at length, however, how his commons might intersect with other scales. As noted above, he favors coordinating contiguous commons so that they can provide regional-scale environmental goods. He is attentive to the global-scale flows of commodities, capital, and labor that connect the residents of Weston to the rest of the world, greatly expanding their ecological footprint, and sees local commons as one way to reduce these larger-scale impacts. While Donahue's work is very much in the vein of agrarian writers such as Wendell Berry, he avoids many of the pitfalls of that tradition, recognizing that not everyone is going to become a family farmer, that the modern division of labor is not going to fade away, and that ways must be found to support 9 billion or 10 billion people in more just and sustainable ways.

While his efforts are entirely commendable, their generalizability is questionable. His vision is subtly radical inasmuch as it challenges late capitalism not through direct, structural critique, but through encouraging people to overcome their alienation from nature, decommodify their consumption where possible, and not allow themselves the luxury of commodity fetishism. Yet he never deals head-on with the way Weston's commons are funded by surplus from precisely the economic relations he criticizes. Weston is an extremely wealthy suburb of Boston, one of the wealthiest, most highly educated urban areas in the wealthiest country on earth. Donahue repeatedly acknowledges that the nonprofit that runs the town's conservation lands - its commons - generally breaks even or loses money, even though it is subsidized by residents through direct memberships, tax revenues, bond issues, and the sale of high-priced apple cider to the parents of the children who just helped to make it. In short, working landscapes or not, these commons absorb more economic surplus than they generate. The surplus that supports one-quarter of the town's land as commons comes, one way or another, from metropolitan Boston's position as a leading center in medical services and technology, the computer industry, higher education, and other highly globalized, capital- and technology-intensive industries. While Donahue returns again and again to the question of ecological accounting, rightly asking us to consider how much that California orange really costs when oil, subsidized irrigation, and synthetic agricultural inputs are taken into account, he does not add up the real cost of the produce grown by the children of suburban elites on land removed from the market by town residents eager to preserve a rural enclave a few minutes' drive from their Boston offices, with the help of a full-time nonprofit staff supported by donations and tax revenues.

#### Profit motive prevents aff solvency.

Andreoni 20 – (Valeria, "The Trap of Success: A Paradox of Scale for Sharing Economy and Degrowth" Sustainability 12, no. 8: 3153. <https://doi.org/10.3390/su12083153> 2020)//gcd

From a theoretical perspective, if large similarities exist between sharing economy and degrowth, then extensive discrepancies occur in the way in which these two concepts are applied. As reported above, the sharing economy is a worldwide phenomenon rapidly growing across sectors and activities. Degrowth, on the contrary, has been developed through a model of living and academic debate and, up to now, a limited number of applications have taken place [50]. One of the inhibiting factors can be related to the difficulties in applying an alternative model in a system when the profit-oriented logic drives the main socio-economic dynamics. For this reason, a consistent overview of the possible implications generated by large-scale applications of degrowth is still missing. Given the fact that degrowth ideas could generate effective transformations only when adopted by the largest part of consumers, a specific analysis would be needed to investigate the impacts and feasibility of large-scale applications. Within this context, the main objective of the next sections is to hypothesize and discuss a paradox of scale, potentially able to drive the failure of alternative economic models. Given the fact that, from a theoretical perspective, many similarities exist between sharing economy and degrowth, the next approximate is the sharing economy as a large-scale application of degrowth. In particular, the main contradictions existing between the promises of the sharing economy and degrowth, are compared to the outcomes generated by practices. The discrepancies are then used to discuss the feasibility of large-scale applications of alternative economic models, such as degrowth. Being aware that the approximations used in this paper inevitably lead to simplifications, the objective of this analysis aligns with the idea previously discussed in other publications [50,69,70]. Testing the degrowth hypothesis through modeling and empirical assessments can contribute to develop the debate around sustainable transitions to build the bridge between academic discourse, socio-political initiatives, and business environment. 3.2. Promises versus Outcomes of Practices: Analysis of the Socio-Economic and Environmental Impacts Following the approach previously used by other papers [3,30], the main frames used to define the sharing economy are compared, in this section, with the socio-economic and environmental impacts generated by practices. The main objective is to identify existing tensions and to discuss the sustainability challenges of sharing. Starting from the analytical framework reported in Table 2, the main discrepancies existing between promises and practices are reported below. In Table 3, the main elements of discussion are summarized. 3.3. Economic Dimension: Promises versus Impacts of Practices A. Disrupt centralized institutions and large corporations versus creation of oligopolies: According to previous studies [26,28,30,71], the network externalities and economies of scale generated using Internet platforms, has facilitated the development of oligopolies and has reduced the market for small and local enterprises. In line with the examples reported in Table 1, most of the sharing economy’s submarkets tend to be dominated by a small number of companies that earned the dominating status by designing a specific business model or through an early market entry. The large quantity of transactions, needed to compensate the costs of technological investments, has converged the successful platform toward oligopolistic structures, clearly in contrast with the idea of “disrupt centralized institutions and large corporations” included as one of the promises of sharing [72,73]. B. Encourage small and local enterprise versus small-business competition: Instead of promoting small and local enterprises, the sharing economy has resulted in increased competition [74]. The development of sharing accommodation practices, such as Airbnb or Couchsurfing, for example, has provided a substitute for hotel nights in the cheaper segment of the market and has radically changed consumers’ preferences and behavior. According to [75], the users of the sharing economy (generally looking for cheaper solutions, local authenticity, and more unique experiences) have shifted the demand from the traditional hotel industry toward the sharing hospitality. Therefore, the market share of the small and family-run accommodations has been reduced. In addition, the possibility to supply accommodation without the need to be compliant with the regulations affecting the hospitality sector (such as fire, health and safety standards, and taxation) represents an element of unfair competition affecting the small businesses operating in the market. The lower costs associated with a lack of standards and regulations, has contributed to drive a reduction in the average hospitality price. According to data provided by [76], the increased competition among small accommodation providers has generated 8–10% revenue loss in the hotel sector in Austin, Texas. In a similar way, the estimation provided by [77] calculated that the 416,000 guests staying in Airbnb in July 2013 has generated around one million lost room nights for city hotels in New York. On the contrary, large corporations, offering hospitality solutions for business travelers, medium-high income consumers, and package holidays do not seem to be significantly affected [76,77]. C. Empowering individuals by promoting flexible employment opportunities and additional sources of income versus working-related uncertainties: The sharing economy has framed itself as a provider of flexible employment opportunities, where traditional employment contracts are substituted by short-term and freelance work [78]. The main implications of this working structure, however, seem to benefit businesses more than workers. Classifying workers as independent contractors, allow businesses to reduce the costs and to remove the legal liability for accidents arising at work. The lack of pension and insurance, together with income instability and insecurities is, on the contrary, one of the main downsides affecting the workers involved in the sharing economy’s markets [79,80]. In addition, the rapid expansion of this underregulated and underpaid working logic, is also affecting the traditional working markets. When an increasing number of agents get involved in the logic of less security and more flexibility, the overall working conditions can decline [81–83]. As reported by De Stefano [81] (p. 6), “extreme flexibility, shifting of risks to workers and income instability have long become a reality for a portion of the workforce in current labor markets that goes far beyond the persons employed in the gig-economy.” It can indeed be argued that working on collaborative platforms is part of a much vaster trend toward the casualization of labor [84,85]. D. Promote cheaper and easiest access to goods and services and provide opportunities for income redistribution, revenue, and savings versus prices increase, income disparities, and tax avoidance: As reported above, the easiest and cheapest access to goods and services has been described as an opportunity to increase consumption possibilities, particularly for the lowest-income categories. When considering the supply side of the sharing practices, however, the sharing economy can contribute to amplifying the income disparities existing in society [86]. As reported by [87], for example, the additional revenue generated by sharing accommodation benefits people with a middle or upper-income level. That is because, the lower-income categories, characterized by a limited availability of goods to share, are typically excluded from the supply side of the market. Sharing accommodation, has also been criticized for the negative impacts generated on the price of the long-term renting accommodation. The increase in profitability of short-term renting has driven a reduction of long-term renting supply, with consequent impacts for the lower-income categories living in rented accommodation. According to data provided by [88], the average renting price in New York has increased by 11% between 2005 and 2012, with an average income rise of just 2%. The redistributive factors of the sharing activities have also been largely criticized in relation to taxation. According to data provided by [89], the sharing economy was estimated to be worth about $15 billion in 2015 with the potential to grow to £$335 billion in 2025. The amount of tax collected, however, is limited and controversial. Airbnb, for example, is financially located in Ireland, where the money made from transactions taking place all over the world are collected. The lack of clear accountability and the related difficulties to track income, make tax avoidance an element of unfair market competition and a major social issue. The unclear international regulation and the difficulties in public surveillance, creates a clear opportunity for fiscal avoidance, with consequent implications for social disparities and redistribution [28,72]. In addition, as reported by [10], the fact that platforms do not give governments the access to transactions and user data does not facilitate the enforcement of regulations and the design of clear and consistent taxation systems. The creation of institutional boundaries, such as the cap in the number of nights offered in sharing accommodation is, for example, difficult to apply without a clear track of users and suppliers. A. Increase social bonding and collaboration versus social drivers’ reduction: As reported above, the sharing economy has often been described as a tool to generate a new form of collaborations, solidarity, and social bonding [34,90–93]. Researches have, however, highlighted that most of the sharing economy users have no desire to increase community bonds or to share communal links with other members [29]. The ability of platforms to create social connections seems also to have decreased over scale and time. According to studies published by [94,95], when a market expands, economic reasons prevail, and interpersonal connections became more casual and less durable. In a similar way, an analysis investigating the main car sharing motivations highlight that opportunistic and self-interest behaviors play a much more significant role than socio-environmental motivations [79]. Price convenience, savings, and accessibility seem to be the main factors driving most of the consumers’ choices toward sharing economy options [96–98]. B. Increase conviviality and community trust versus discrimination: Instead of increasing social equality and community trust, the sharing economy seems to be characterized by some degree of exclusionary and discriminatory behaviors [40]. Based on studies published [99–102], prejudicial discriminations in ratings and reviews have been found for Afro-American guests and Afro-American Airbnb owners and Uber drivers have reported to be discriminated in terms of longer average waiting times and more frequent cancellations. C. Networking increases versus reduction of face-to-face interactions: When the market expands and more profit-oriented actors enter in the sharing economy’s businesses, the social contacts and face-to-face interactions seem to reduce. The increasing use of online quality ratings, for example, contributes to the declining importance of personal relationships. In addition, the introduction of technological innovations, such as the smart locks on sharing accommodation, provides users with a digital service of check-in and key handover that allow for a complete avoidance of social interactions [10]. According to [103], 75% of Airbnb’s overall revenue come from rentals where the owners do not share the space with users. The initial idea of social connections, interactions, and trust have been taken over by activities operating with a small degree of social and face-to-face interactions. D. Promote the use of participative online resources such as open access, open sources, and collaborative platform versus income, cultural, and aging constraints: The development of information and communication technologies has been considered as an opportunity to facilitate the use of participative online resources and to democratize the access to information. However, the difficulties that a relevant percentage of the world population are experiencing in catching-up with technological development is de facto an element of exclusion for a large amount of people with income, cultural, and ageing constraints [104]. When applied to the context of the sharing activities, this general downside of information and communication technologies, can then exclude a specific group of people from participating in sharing exchanges. According to [75], for example 53% of the users are under 40 years old and across all the sharing economy industries the usage seems to decrease with an increasing age. 3.5. Environmental Dimension: Promises versus Impacts of Practices A. Reduce consumption versus consumption increase: As highlighted by [105], a relative cost reduction can increase the overall market demand. In the sharing economy, different elements can contribute to generate a “rebound effect” detrimental for resources: • The development of the sharing economy platforms and the creation of new markets expand the volume of commerce and inject additional purchasing power into the economy. In addition, the development of “on demand” economy (e.g., Uber), where the consumer creates new capacity by arranging a service that would not have been made in the first place, is in contrast with the idea of reducing the overall level of demand. The reduction of prices generated by (i) increasing competition, (ii) reduced dependency on ownership, and (iii)reduction of searching costs, can contribute to the rise of consumption [10, 40,106]. • The easiest and cheapest access to goods and services can stimulate unsustainable and indulgent consumption [107,108]. The cost reduction and the accessible increase related to car sharing practices, for example, can generate additional journeys and reduce the public transport demand. The possibility to cover a part of the travelling cost, offered for example by Blablacar and Kangaride, can change the individual decision on the travelling mode and, as reported above, increase the demand for less sustainable practices [4,109]. • The large amount of information made available by the use of the Internet, provides an extensive source of evidence about past usage patterns and consumers’ preferences. The online companies, with an easy access to consumer’s information, can use targeted advertising and tailored promotions to increase sales and market share. In addition, a tension also exists in relation to the fact that city cycle schemes are usually financed through advertising of large and multinational corporations, as Santander in London or Coca-Cola in Belfast. B. Reduction of energy and material demand versus increased use of energy and resources: A lack of clear data investigating the environmental impacts of the sharing practices make it difficult to analyze the transition toward a more sustainable economy. At the present, no clear evidence exists around the reduction of energy and material demand [10]. On the contrary, a study published by [110] shows that the ecological footprint of e-business is greater than conventional shopping. C. Promote reuse and responsible consumption versus lack of care: The short-term social relationships characterizing most of the sharing economy activities and the fact that consumers are paying for a temporary service, generally lead to a lack of caring attitude and reduce the incentives to treat products gently [4]. In line with the idea of moral hazard and information asymmetries, involved with shared resources [111], the deterioration rate of goods can be higher than in the case of a private ownership. In addition, recent studies suggest that users’ environmental motivations are often less important than the economic ones [112,113]. 4. Discussion: Paradox of Scale and Future Research Directions Based on the analysis reported above, the main findings of this paper can be summarized by the fact that the recent developments of the sharing practices seem to be in contrast with the theoretical frameworks used to define the socio-economic and environmental characteristics of sharing. When the scale expands, a profit-oriented logic seems to prevail and the idea of a more sustainable and socially connected economic system fails to be delivered. In particular, the profit opportunities are attracting an increasing number of for-profit businesses that use the socio-environmental and egalitarian statements as a way to increase the market share. In addition, the use of information and communication technologies, the related reduction of interpersonal connections, and the exclusion of people unable to catch up with technological development, impose constraints on social interactions and participation. As a result, the impacts and goals of the sharing economy seem to converge toward those of the traditional economic practices, where profit opportunities prevail on socio-environmental motivations. As previously highlighted by other authors [26,28], the theoretical pathway to equity and sustainability has been successfully reframed as a new form of neoliberal capitalism. Within this context, the findings of this paper highlight the risk of a paradox of scale, where the sharing economy fails to deliver as a consequence of success. If from one side, the more sustainable behaviors can generate effective changes only when applied by the majority of actors, on the other side, large-scale applications and expansion risk converging toward the traditional economic practices. This sort of trap is also highlighted by the recent path taken by the development of some local currencies. Initially organized as a way to sustain local business and promote a more responsible consumption, some of the local currencies have today expanded to include franchising and corporation activities. An example is provided by Colu, the Liverpool Local Pound, where franchising accounts for more than 10% of the businesses listed in the website. In addition, the percentage discount offered to consumers that purchase products by using the local currency is a stimulus for consumption increase, clearly in contrast with the idea of responsible consumption and sustainability. The use of virtual coins and the necessity to have mobile phones and internet connection also represent a factor of exclusion for the oldest and the less wealthy categories of society that in contrast would be those that could benefit the most from the development of a local and fairer economy.

#### Cant cope with large-scale problems like climate and redistribution.

Damian **WHITE** Prf. Rhode Island School of Design **’19** “Ecological Democracy, Just Transitions and a Political Ecology of Design” *Environmental Values* 28 p. 44-46

Debate has ranged in urban design circles for many years now as to how we can reconcile the tension between Jane Jacob’s vision of a bottom-up driven vision of an urban future and the vision of the master builder offered by Robert Moses. Thinking beyond both forms of ‘horizontalism’ that overstate the capacities of grass-roots innovation to change the world and paternalistic ‘verticalist’ imaginaries with their command-and-obedience models of social change would seem long overdue. Transition projects compatible with just, democratic and effective outcomes are going to be multi-scalar and complex in their forms of institutional design. We are going to need effective representative and participatory democratic structures, modes of radical municipalism and strong democratic states, informed and engaged publics and accountable professionals, civic experts and responsible civil servants who serve the public interest to build sustainable and post carbon futures.

What, though, are the limits of contemporary radical design theory? Let me now draw out four concerns here. First, it could be observed that a great deal of radical and transition design recognises the need for multi-level and multi-scalar modes of redirective practices; the levels of everyday life and the local are almost always foregrounded as spaces for intervention for a design politics. In part, this is a product of the fact that these spaces often provide the initial sites where much design is able to make an intervention. There is some variation here between industrial design, service design, landscape design and urban/regional planning, with the scales of engagement progressively chang- ing. If users are persistently attended to in design, and radical designers like Manzini (2015) have thought hard about how micro-publics could be brought into more participatory engagements with the project of redesigns through community planning, public meetings, new interfaces and so on, the broader institutional contexts and representative structures that could guide and direct a design politics functioning at larger scales have not been adequately theorised. The role that local, regional, federal, national and post-national state structures might play in facilitating or supporting design for the just transition is under-theorised.

Second, the overwhelming focus in radical design on civil society as the space of innovation has ensured that most contemporary currents of radical design have had very little to say about the opportunities for democratic redesign of the workplace or the proposition that radical designs might actually emerge out of workplace struggle(see White 2015) as well as broader civic struggles for new forms of collective consumption outside the workplace (Cohen 2017; Goldstein 2018). Traditions of worker-orientated design need to be re- covered here. It was designers working with Scandinavian trade unionists in the 1970s and 1980s and attempts to bring together industry democracy with workers’ self-management at the Lucas Plan in the UK (amongst other places) that played a very significant role in inspiring the rise of the participatory de- sign movement (see Ehn et al. 2014). Equally it could be observed that most contemporary radical design literatures have little to say about redesign of the workplace for more emancipatory ends but even less to say about how public institutions could be made more democratic by design but also act as potential partners with civil society to expand the possibilities of drawing publics into design discussions. The state has a very loose presence in Manzini’s visions of a co-created commons (Manzini 2015). It has even less presence in Tony Fry’s vision of redirective practice (Fry 2009), which maintains, in an apocalyptic vein, that existing state forms are unlikely to survive in a radically warmed future marked by social and ecological breakdown and the mass movement of people. John Barry (2012), Christian Parenti (2012) and most recently, Laurence Delina (2016) have all compellingly argued in contrast to these positions that the democratic state, despite its many failings, must play a critical role in transition. Parenti argues that it is the state that is the only institution large enough and powerful enough with the power to: (a) face down the fossil-fuel industry; (b) redirect the trillions of dollars of finance and in- vestment that will be required to fund climate mitigation and adaptation; (c) enact continental scales of energy, green industrial and green infrastructure retrofitting; (d) redirect national research and development priorities towards ecological innovation; (e) embark on long-range national democratic planning to facilitate optimal strategies for climate adaptation and resilience.

Parenti’s statism has its limits. The state can’t do everything. As Hillary Wainwright (1994) has long argued, unless a transition state is held accountable to a fully mobilised transition-orientated civil society engaged in redirective practice, the transition state may well repeat the problems of the conventional state in being ‘all thumbs and no fingers’ (Lindblom, cited in Dryzek 2000: 24). But it seems evident that post carbon transitions are unlikely to be suc- cessful without reworked relations between a democratic transition state and democratic transition currents in civil society.

Third, radical and critical design literatures are insufficiently alert to the many ways in which neoliberalism can happily feed off, co-opt or co-exist with all manner of bottom-up social design experiments and co-created institutions. Here lies the danger of Manzini’s tendency to take as given neo-liberal stories of the end of the welfare state. We have already seen in the United Kingdom that conservative projects like David Cameron’s Big Society can easily co-opt all manner of mutualist and bottom-up social design enterprises and use them as arguments for unravelling the welfare state and state provision**.** What is generally missing in a good deal of radical design discourse is extended engagement with the ways in which smart policymaking and revised bureaucratic institutions might be able to protect and augment the voices of civil society and its design experiments from below. The co-creation of alter- native institutions has possibilities, but without macro policy and institutional support for such policies (in the form of a robust green welfare state, a uni- versal basic income scheme, maximum and minimum wages, guaranteed paid time off and the provision of childcare and care for the elderly), diverse modes of eco-design led social innovation can merely end up giving voice and agency to the time rich and commitment light (White 2015).

#### Insurgency fails:

#### It makes research and strategy toxic. Mutually supportive dialogue and deliberation is infinitely more efficacious than insurgent politics.

George **LIPSITZ** Black Studies @ UC SB **‘4** “Abolition democracy and global justice” *Comparative American Studies* 2 (3) p. 271-276

Abstract As new social relations produce new kinds of social subjects, scholars in American Studies and Area Studies experience anxieties about disciplinary as well as geographic borders. The Civil Rights tradition of the 14th Amendment plays an important role within progressive American Studies scholarship, but in the course of seeking equality and exclusion within the USA, this tradition runs the risk of occluding the role of the nation in the world and its central role in creating and preserving inequality and injustice in other nations. An emerging emphasis on struggles for social justice without seeking state power encapsulates many of the most progressive impulses within Area Studies and transnational studies, yet this perspective runs the risk of occluding the enduring importance of the nation-state in inflecting global developments with local histories and concerns. The present moment challenges us to draw on both traditions, and to use each to critique the shortcomings of the other, while at the same time promoting an inclusionary, nonsectarian, and mutually supportive dialogue about our differences. Keywords American Studies ● Area Studies ● inequality ● transnationalism In Jack Conroy’s 1935 short story ‘The Weed King’, a stubborn Missouri farmer wages a one person war against the weeds that spring up in his fields. Believing that farming would be an easy job if it were not for the weeds, he dedicates himself to their eradication with a zeal that astounds his fellow workers. The ‘weed king’ embraces his war against weeds as his reason for being. ‘His only vanity,’ Conroy tells us, is his belief that he has ‘put the quietus to more weeds than any man, woman, child or beast west of the Mississippi’ (Conroy, 1985: 101). Even in the winter time when snow covers the ground, the zealot worries night and day about the tiny seeds waiting to bloom in the spring. One of his neighbors points out that weeds have their uses too, that many of them have greatly-needed medicinal powers. However, the weed king is not deterred. He soon succeeds in suppressing most of the weeds on his property. His singleminded zealotry has its costs, however. The measures he takes to kill the weeds prove fatal to his crops as well. At the present moment of tumultuous transformation and change, scholars in American Studies and Area Studies might be tempted to emulate the weed king, to keep a keen eye on our fields to protect what we have been cultivating for so many years, to view each other’s work with trepidation and counter-insurgent zeal. American Studies scholars worry that the growing enthusiasm for transnational studies threatens to focus too much on exchanges across national boundaries, in the process occluding the unique, particular, and specific inflections given to those processes by distinct national histories, cultures, and politics. Area Studies specialists, many of whom have been part of a decades-long tradition dedicated to constructing epistemologies and ontologies that resist the hegemony of the monolingual, monocultural, and nationalist scholarship of the US academy, rightly fear that a transnational or postnational American Studies might simply project American Exceptionalism onto a broader geographic terrain. Outside the USA, specialists in both American Studies and Area Studies have reason to fear that (wittingly or unwittingly) scholars from the USA will use the power of US capital, communications media, and commerce to substitute a US-centric monologue masquerading as a dialogue for the greatly needed polylateral communication and collaboration that a transnational world requires. At a time when substantive changes in social structures, technology, and politics are radically reconfiguring the relations linking culture, time, and place, policing the boundaries of disciplines speaks to deep desires for continuity and certainty. It is possible to look at the current ferment in our fields and see only what is being lost, to become subsumed with melancholy about lost conversations and conventions. Yet scholarly research should be conducted out of conviction, rather than out of habit. If we are not careful, our work can come to resemble Swedish anthropologist Ulf Hannerz’s definition of Scandinavian cooking – something passed down from generation to generation for no apparent reason (Hannerz, 1992: 42). Like the weed king, we can worry night and day about the purity of our fields. As new social relations throw forth fundamentally new social subjects with new epistemologies, ontologies, archives, and imaginaries, new patterns of scholarly inquiry will inevitably emerge. Will shallow forms of cultural and ideological critique eclipse the grounded insights produced by ethnography or social history? Will the fetishes of archival and ethnographic research methods produce empiricist and myopic work lacking in self-reflexivity? Will comparative work lack the cultural and linguistic depth traditionally produced by primarily national studies? Will national studies ignore the ways in which nationalism itself is a transnational project? Will the proliferation of new social subjects and new objects of study come at the expense of marginalizing aggrieved social groups or will it teach us how social identities become conflated with power in richly generative and productive ways? It is understandable that these kinds of questions arise when we try to do our work. Anything worth doing can nonetheless be done badly, and principled questions from colleagues protect our interests as well as theirs. Yet counter-insurgency is a poor model for scholarly work, and too much attention to pulling out weeds can kill the crops. Even more important, weeds can have curative powers if we learn to use them correctly. The author of ‘The Weed King’ confided to his biographer that his mother believed that ‘weeds’ were simply plants for which no use had yet been found (Wixon, 1994: 32). The ‘weeds’ that invade a field can also inform it in crucially important ways if we learn to recognize their curative powers. Within American Studies, the tradition of 14th Amendment Americanism may seem like the quintessential expression of American exceptionalism. Forged from the freedom dreams and collective struggles of an enslaved people, the 14th Amendment stands as an enduring symbol of the accomplishments of the abolition democracy that ended slavery in the wake of the Civil War. More than a specific Constitutional provision promising equal treatment under law, the 14th Amendment has functioned as a widely shared social warrant authoring and authorizing new ways of knowing and new ways of being. In his indispensable work, Black Reconstruction in America, W.E.B. Du Bois demonstrated how slaves fighting for their freedom soon realized that it would not be enough to be merely ‘free’ in a society premised on their exclusion. In the course of staging a general strike in the fields, running away from slavery to swell the ranks of the Union army, and joining together to work land liberated by military force, they formulated a political perspective that Du Bois named ‘abolition democracy’ (Du Bois, 1995). They fought for the 13th, 14th, and 15th Amendments to the Constitution. At the Charleston Black Convention in 1865 they called for more than nominal freedom, for the development of their full being as humans. Between 1865 and 1877 they fashioned alliances with poor whites to elect progressive majorities to office, and their successes led to the first universal public education systems in the South, to governments that subsidized the general economic infrastructure rather than just the privileges and property of the elite. Although betrayed by the Compromise of 1877, by the removal of federal troops from the South, by the legal consolidation of the combination of sharecropping and Jim Crow Segregation, and by Supreme Court decisions that took protections away from black people and extended them to corporations, abolition democracy and the 14th Amendment successfully challenged the hegemony of white male Protestant propertied power. It opened the door for subsequent claims for social justice by immigrants and their children, religious minorities, women, workers and people with disabilities. From voting rights to affirmative action, from fair housing to fair hiring, the 14th Amendment is an enduring and abiding force for social justice in US society. Yet American Studies scholarship that subsumes social justice under the rubric of the 14th Amendment runs the risk of ignoring the position of the USA in the world. Celebrating struggles for citizenship inside the USA can work to strengthen the distinctions between citizens and aliens, providing legitimation for nationalist and nativist policies that impose enormous suffering on humans precisely because they are not US citizens. The legacy of the 14th Amendment has not prevented women and blacks in contemporary California from supporting anti-immigrant nativism through Proposition 187, aimed at denying immigrants and their children needed state services, or through Proposition 227, banning bilingual education in the state’s classrooms. Post-1965 immigrants from Asia, who owe their entry into to the USA to the civil rights movement and its exposure of previous national origin quotas as racist, have not been immune to pursuing the privileges of whiteness for themselves by opposing affirmative action and school desegregation policies vital to the well-being of blacks and Latinos. At the same time, the power inequalities that separate even the most aggrieved US citizens from the masses of poor and working people around the world can render struggles for full 14th Amendment rights by US citizens to be little more than what Martin Luther King, Jr used to describe as ‘an equal right to do wrong’. Certainly the prominence of Colin Powell and Condoleeza Rice in forging the rationale for the 2003 invasion and occupation of Iraq demonstrates the limits of this form of inclusion. If abolition democracy emblematizes the emancipatory tradition within American Studies, the idea of collective and linked struggles for change without aiming for control over any one state expresses the uniquely generative stance within transnational social movements and transnational scholarship. Articulated in the form of a manifesto in John Holloway’s Change the World Without Taking Power, this sensibility has taken on activist form in the work of the EZLN in Mexico, the Gabriela Network in the Philippines, and the Okinawan Women Act Against Military Violence in that Japanese prefecture (Holloway, 2002). These movements make demands on the state and recognize the specificity of national histories, cultures and politics, but their aspirations and activities cannot be contained with any single national context. The activities of the Okinawan Women Act Against Military Violence (OWAAMV) demonstrate the importance of a transnational perspective that goes beyond the history, culture, and politics of any single nation state (Fukumura and Matsuoka, 2002). Coming from a country that has been serially colonized since the 17th century and occupied militarily by both the USA and Japan, OWAAMV activists cannot solve their problems within a single national context. Disadvantaged by colonial status, race, and gender, they cannot turn to national liberation, anti-racism or feminism as their sole context for struggle. Coming from a small island with a limited population in a corner of the world far removed from metropolitan centers of power, they must forge alliances with outsiders based on political affinities and identifications, rather than counting on the solidarities of sameness that sustain most social movements. As eyewitnesses to brutal combat on the island in 1945 that killed more than 130,000 Okinawan civilians (one-third of the local population) and tens of thousands of Japanese and US military personnel, they find it impossible to celebrate organized violence and masculinist militarism (Hein and Selden, 2003: 13). As women confronted with the pervasive presence of commercial sex establishments, sex tourism and rapes of civilian women and girls by military personnel, they see gender as a central axis of power and struggle. The complicated history that brought the OWAAMV into existence, and which vexes them in so many ways, has produced new ways of being and new ways of knowing that contain enormous generative power for scholars in Ethnic Studies and American Studies. They do not seek to make their nation militarily superior to others. Instead, they argue that massive preparation for war increases rather than decreases the likelihood of violence. Moreover, they argue that military spending creates security for states and financial institutions but not for people. They charge that expenditures on war serve to contain and control people like themselves who oppose the global economic system, who challenge neoliberal policies designed to privatize state assets, lower barriers to trade and limit the power of local entities to regulate the environment. Perhaps most important, they call for a new definition of ‘security’, one that places the security of women, children and ordinary people before the security of the state and financial institutions. They ‘queer’ the nation – not because they take an explicit position on the rights of gays and lesbians, but because they interrupt and contest the narrative of patriarchal protection upon which the nation-state so often rests. By necessity, the OWAAMV go beyond the categories and cognitive mappings of area studies. They are citizens of Japan, but also victims of Japanese and US colonialism. On most issues, they feel more in solidarity with the indigenous Sovereignty Movement in Hawai’i or the Gabriela network mobilizing against sex tourism and sex work near military bases than they do with their fellow citizens of Japan. The nature of US imperialism forces them to seek alliances with pacifists and feminists in the USA, with Puerto Rican activists fighting against US military exercises on the island of Vieques, and with the Okinawans transported to Bolivia during the Cold War era when the Japanese and US governments relocated them in that South American nation so their land could be appropriated for military uses. They feel solidarity with witnesses to war and empire everywhere, recognizing that the things that have happened in their part of the Pacific cannot be contained within any one ‘area’ of study. Transnational organizing of mobilizations for change, without directly seeking to take state power, speak directly to the new circuits and networks of power emerging from new forms of production,

consumption, communication and repression. They often display brilliant ingenuity in fashioning seemingly unlikely short-term alliances, affinities and identifications with people across class, gender, race and national lines. Yet this very tactical dexterity makes it difficult to turn temporary victories into long-term institutional changes. Strategies that manifest the mobility and dynamism required for challenging transnational corporations and financial institutions often lack the concentrated power needed to challenge the enduring power of the state and its control over the prisons, armies and police agencies deployed in support of private power everywhere. Even more important, flexible, fluid and dynamic coalitions often lack both the organic solidarity and the connecting ideology that make movements successful. Groups engaged in this kind of struggle can become unexpected allies in each other’s struggles, but they can also easily be manipulated into fighting against each other if they do not develop a systemic analysis of global power. Scholars can be pitted against each other as easily as aggrieved communities can. In an era of carefully orchestrated challenges to public education, scholarly independence and critical thinking, it is likely in the near future that every department, discipline and field will be encouraged to defend its own worth by belittling others, to compete for scarce and declining resources by inflating its own achievements at the expense of others. A losing proposition in politics, this ‘race to the bottom’ would be even more disastrous for scholarship because it encourages parochialism and defensive localism at precisely the moment when we most need dialogue, generosity and cosmopolitanism. It is important in this context to identify and learn from scholarly works that offer models of principled and productive synthesis between American Studies and Area Studies. Fortunately, both well established classics and promising new work in both American Studies and Area Studies contain this generative potential. The scholarly works of W.E.B. Du Bois and Walter Rodney provide especially useful and generative models from the past, while recent studies by Melani McAlister, Lise Waxer, Roderick Ferguson and Clyde Woods pose bold and exciting challenges in the present (Ferguson, 2004; McAlister, 2001; Waxer, 2002; Woods, 1998).

#### It prevents criticism of poor state actions because of fears of neoliberalism.

Alain **TOURAINE** Sociology @ Ecole des Hautes Etudes (Paris) **‘1** *Beyond Neoliberalism* p. 85-88

The end of the neo-liberal illusion has weakened and disoriented the right, which has been violently rejected by univer- sal suffrage. The right is also paralysed by the National Front, as it cannot form a government with it and cannot form a government without it. Logically, the debate is therefore not so much one between right and left as a debate within the left. There are in fact two debates, and they define three lefts.

The most surprising debate is perhaps that between those who want to give a new priority to public order and to ensuring that institutions work properly, rather than to what they see as confused, directionless or dangerous social dynamics, and those who want, on the contrary, to prioritize social ac- tors, their conflicts and their situation. The former call them- selves republicans; their numbers are growing and they are bold enough to publish texts which might look to a casual reader as though they had been produced by the right, albeit a civilized right, whose prime concern is respect for law and order.

Their main strength comes, perhaps, from the increasingly shocking lack of realism of the ultra-left, the one which defines itself as the left of the left or as being to the left of the left. The latter description appears to me to be the more accurate, as 'left' is a political and not a social term and the defining feature of this ultra-left is its opposition to the government, which it accuses of having surrendered to la pensee unique. Many believe that only the ultra-left is talking realistically in a country that has been stricken by unemployment and job insecurity. It in fact mobilizes mainly to defend the public sector, and it is increasingly difficult to believe that a critique of poor state management necessarily leads to unfettered neoliberalism. The 'people' to which these intellectuals refer is in fact looking more and more like an ideological object.

Is there any living space left between the republicans and the populists of the ultra-left? The answer may be 'yes' in principle, but it is much more ambiguous at the level of prac- tice. I have shown that today's sans-papiers and homosexuals have, like the beurs of the recent past and women and ecol- ogists past and present, created cultural movements that de- fend both equality and difference and demand recognition of the cultural rights of minorities. We have to accept that there is a very real tendency for European governments to move to the centre-right or the centre-left. Those who say that 'the left' and 'the right' are two of a kind now sound so stupid! What gives them the right to regard as imbeciles all those who take a passionate interest in electoral battles between the left and the right? These governments are not only repub- lican in the current sense of the word; they are committed to social reform, and greater European unity will take us closer to Jacques Delors's concept of a social Europe. But these are of course political rather than social actions. On the other hand, we are seeing manifestations of the ultra-left, at least in France. Even if one thinks, as I do, that these have misinter- preted the crises and protests we see in French society, they do exist. We have all met them, especially in the media. We therefore have to ask whether the increasingly centrist repub- licans and the ultra-leftists leave any room for anything other than a centre-left government?

I have just mentioned a certain number of social and cul- tural movements. It has to be admitted that they are frag- mented, discontinuous and often dependent upon external supports. I therefore have to accept that the existence of this social left, which is demanding both equality and difference, is patchy rather than organized. Its importance is reflected by public opinion polls rather than by events. Although it has been marginalized by the government, it enjoys strong sup- port among socialist politicians, in the CFDT and, above all, in many voluntary organizations. It is present in civil society, which now has almost no political voice of its own, rather than in either the large or small parties, or even the sects of the ultra-left. This book attempts to help it to both recognize itself and act.

The easiest way to understand the nature of the social left is to compare it with the ultra-left. The social left and the ultra-left are divided by a traditional conflict over ideas and actions. The ultra-left speaks of power and domination in terms that leave no room for autonomous action on the part of the victims. The only task of the 'proletarians' - old and new - is to burst asunder the contradictions of the dominant system. It is up to the political leaders and the intellectuals to tell the victims what domination means and to fight it by either rely- ing on the state or taking control of the state. Such is the logic of revolutionary action.

The social left, in contrast, takes as its starting point the idea that all social movements begin with the active defence of a social reality and rights. Once, it was the nation against the king, and more recently, it was workers against bosses. Today, it is a matter of defending the cultural rights of all (and especially of minorities) against forced assimilation, irrespect- ive of whether it is forced upon us by a market-dominated mass culture or by a communitarian power. Defensive actions and proposals for future action can be autonomous, and can therefore have a direct influence on political decisions. They do not simply denounce: they are born of hope, and are there- fore democratically inspired.

In the type of society in which we now live, ten years after the collapse of the Soviet system and the Soviet empire, only tiny minorities support revolutionary thought. On the contrary, the extension of democracy from the political domain to social problems (which is slow and difficult) and now to cultural democracy (which still meets with strong resistance on the part of both left and right) now seems to be the central issue in public life. In that sense, it is very paradoxical to claim that only the ultra-left is paying attention to popular movements. While the ultra-left is preoccupied with defending the state economy against the globalization of the economy, it is in fact the other left that is trying both to defend those work- ers who are most in danger of unemployment and to have the cultural rights of minorities recognized. Reality will refute the relentless propaganda of those who would have us believe the opposite.

#### The military cracks down.

deBoer 16 (Fredrik, Limited-Term Lecturer, Introductory Composition at Purdue Program, 3/15/16, “c’mon, guys,” http://fredrikdeboer.com/2016/03/15/cmon-guys/)

I could be wrong about the short-term dangers, and the stakes are incredibly high. But in the end we’re left with the same old question: what tactics will **actually work to secure a better world?**

In a sharp, sober piece about the meaning of left-wing political violence in the 1970s, Tim Barker writes “If you can’t acknowledge radical violence, radicals are reduced to mere victims of repression, rather than political actors who made definite tactical choices under given political circumstances.” **The problem**, as Barker goes on to imply, is those tactical choices: in today’s America they will essentially **never break on the side of armed opposition against the state**. The government knows everything about you, I’m sorry to say, your movements and your associations and the books you read and the things you buy and what you’re saying to the people you communicate with. That’s simply on the level of information, before we even get to the state’s incredible capacity to inflict violence.

Look, **the world has changed**. The relative military capacity of regular people compared to establishment governments has changed, especially in fully developed, technology-enabled countries like the United States. The Czar had his armies, yes, but the Czar’s armies depended on manpower above and beyond everything else. The fighting was still mostly different groups of people with rifles shooting at each other. If tomorrow you could rally as many people as the Bolsheviks had at their revolutionary peak, you’re still left **in a world of F-15s, drones, and cluster bombs**. And that’s to say nothing of the fact that establishment governments in the developed world can rely on the **numbing agents of capitalist luxuries** and the American dream to damper revolutionary enthusiasm even among the many millions who have been marginalized and impoverished. **This just isn’t 1950s Cuba**, guys. **It’s just not**. In a very real way, modern technology effectively lowers the odds of armed political revolution in a country like the United States **to zero**, and so much the worse for us.

**This isn’t fatalism**. It doesn’t mean there’s no hope. It means that there is **little alternative to organization**, to changing minds through **committed political action** and using the available nonviolent means to create change: a concert of grassroots organizing, labor tactics, and **partisan politics**. Those things aren’t exactly likely to work, either, but they’re a **hell of a lot more plausible than us dweebs taking the Pentagon**. Bernie Sanders isn’t really a socialist, but he’s a social democrat that moves the conversation to the left, and if people are **dedicated and committed to organizing**, the local, state, and national candidates he inspires will **move it further to the left still**. You got any better suggestions?

Listen, commie nerds. My people. I love you guys. I really do. And I want to build a better world. **Not incrementally, either**, but with the kind of **sweeping and transformative change** that is required to fix a world of such deep injustice. But **seriously**: none of us are ever going to take to the barricades. And it’s a good thing, too, because we’d probably find a way to shoot in the wrong direction. I can’t dribble a basketball without falling down. American socialism is largely made up of bookish dreamers. I love those people but they’re not for fighting. And even if you have a particular talent for combat, you’re looking at fighting the combined forces of Google, Goldman Sachs, and the defense industry. Violence is hard. Soldiering is hard. In an era of the NSA and military robots, it’s really, really hard. **“Should we condone revolutionary violence?” is dorm room, pass-the-bong conversation fodder**, of **precisely the moral and intellectual weight** of “should we torture a guy if we know there’s a bomb and we know he knows where it is and we know we can stop it if we do?” It’s built on **absurd hypotheticals**, propped up by the power of anxious machismo, and undertaken to **no practical political end**. It’s understandable. I get it, I really do. But it’s got nothing to do with us. The only way forward is the **grubby, unsexy work of building coalitions** and asking people to climb on board

#### The frame of insurgency is authoritarian. The negative traps all action in revolutionary politics. Creating the paradigm of all or nothing, us v them, politics creates atrocities, economic and ecological disaster.

Fred **HALLIDAY** IR @ London School of Economics **‘3** “Finding the Revolutionary in Revolution” in *The Future of Revolutions* ed. John Foran p 306-309

A second issue central to discussion of revolution today is that of the historic legacy of revolutions. Writers on revolution like to invoke Marx's observation about the weight of past generations lying on the minds of the present; it has been often stated that all revolutions invoke symbols and claims derived from the past, real or imagined. The revolutionaries of the twentieth century all looked, in some degree, backwards: Lenin and Trotsky to 1789, Mao and Ho to I9I7, Castro to the 1890s, Khomeini to the seventh century. The present discussion of revolution seems, at first sight, not to do this. Political sociologists do look at earlier revolutions, but this is without practical import. Discussion of the possibility of change, particularly that linked to the anti-globalization movement, seems to be curiously ahistorical. The price of this is, however, that not only is inspiration from the past muted but, equally, lessons are not learnt. Here something curious seems to have happened since the collapse of communism: the amnesia of neoliberal discussion, which consigns all that was associated with the communist experiment to the dustbin, seems to be replicated in the case of the radical movements of today. But to do this is questionable. In this latter respect, there are dangers, of an amnesia that is long on enthusiasm but short on responsibility and realism. For the fact is that the history of revolution in modern times is one not only of resistance, heroism and idealism, but also of terrible suffering and human disaster, of chaos and incompetence under the guise of revolutionary transformation, of the distortion of the finest ideals by corrupt and murderous leaders, and of the creation of societies that are far more oppressive and inefficient than those they seek to overthrow. The anti-globalization movement makes much of revolutionary internationalism: tills is not some benign panacea, but a complex, often abused, transnational practice (Halliday I999). All of this entails confronting something that revolutionaries have always assumed but too often failed to discuss: the ethics of revolution. Denunciation of the given and invocations of an ideal other are not enough (Geras 1989). To grasp this involves a shift beyond the political sociology of revolutions, an academic pursuit that focuses in large measure on the incidence of revolutions, to an analysis of the consequences and longerterm records of revolutionary states. In the course of recent years, in writing my own work on revolutions, I have had reason to visit a number of cities that had served as the centers of world revolution and, if not revolution, anti-imperialist radicalism: Beijing, Havana, Tripoli, Tehran. These were the culminations of upheavals that had produced revolutionary regimes by some strange numerical consistency in, respectively, I949, I959, I969, I979· In every case, one could still discern the outlines of the original revolutionary project: a rejection of exploitation, foreign and domestic, a comnlitment to the transformation of society, internationalist support in rhetoric and deed for those resisting oppression elsewhere. But in the 1990S this had all faded: these were not the wave of the future. Whatever else, it could not be said that the initial revolutionary project was in good shape: few in these countries now believed in the ideological project that had initiated the revolution; corruption and inefficiency were widespread; there was a pervasive desire for change, towards a more open, liberal, society; the initial internationalist appeals had faded. Revolution had, in effect, become tired. It was indeed capitalism, not revolutionary socialism and third-worldism, which in the 1990S formed the global vision of the future. This haphazard and impressionistic response has, however, to be compounded by a reflection on the overall legacy of the century of revolutions: neither form of amnesia - counterrevolutionary or revolutionary - is acceptable. Indeed, amnesia invites the repetition of another common saying with regard to revolutions, that those who ignore history are doomed to repeat it. Here perhaps is one of the most worrying aspects of the contemporary radical movement, be it in its national or internationalist forms: the failure to reflect, critically, on the past record of revolutionary movements. This pertains to models of alternative political and social orders. It pertains to the dangers inherent in any utopian, radicalized, mass movement that lacks clear forms of authority and decision-making. It also involves the espousal, spirited but onlinous, of alternative social orders that could work only if imposed by an authoritarian state**.** A pertinent contemporary example is that of radical environmentalism: the program of de-industrialization, and restricted consumption and travel, entailed by such ideas could only be established, and maintained, by a coercive state. In the international sphere, the simple invocation of solidarity may too often conceal interests of power, and manipulation. In the days of authoritarian Communist Parties, but equally in that of national and communal movements today, unconditional solidarity with repressive organizations may be at odds with any commitment to emancipatory values. Such a critical reflection has to apply, too, to the individuals often invoked for contemporary purposes: Lenin was a visionary, but also a cruel, pompous bigot; Che was a man of heroism and solidarity, but his econonlic programs were a disaster and his austere romanticism at times led to cruelty; Mao freed a quarter of mankind from imperialism, but also repeatedly plunged his society into barbarous conflict and socialexperimentation; Khomeini overthrew the Shah, but his social and political program was reactionary and repressive. A similar pause in romanticization might be applicable to some of the supposed components of the anti-globalization front today: few might defend Saddam Hussein, Kim Jong-il or Ayatollah Khamenei, but there is perhaps too little questioning of the commitment to emancipatory values of the PKK in Turkey, Sendero Luminoso, the FARC in Colombia, the Chechen rebels, to name but some. The Zapatista movement has become for many an icon of hope: but, as contributors to this volume make clear, it is not always itself a model of democratic practice. More importantly, one has to ask if this is the most important experience in the Latin America of the I990S to study: it is part of, but only one part of, a broader crisis of the authoritarian PRI regime that beset Mexico and resulted in the rise on the one hand of the PRD and on the other of the election of Fox in 2000. An open assessment of challenges to authoritarian, and neoliberal, policies in Latin America in the I990S would also examine democratization in Brazil and Chile, and the experience of social movements, be they of women, workers or indigenous peoples, who engaged with reformist states. This need for a critical retrospective on the historical legacy of revolutions is, however, linked to another, perhaps even more pressing, issue, one that pervades the pages of this book, namely the relation of revolution to liberal democracy as a whole. Several contributors point out that where liberal democracy is established revolution is off the agenda. But this reflection may be taken further to ask the question of whether, faced with the alternative, one or other outcome is preferable. The implication of much 'revolutionary' writing over the past century has been that liberal democracy is to be denounced, and those who engage with and in it are reformists, dupes, or, in older language, 'class traitors'. Such a view lives on, in some of the contributions to this book, as in parts of the left. Yet this contrast of reform with revolution is not some eternal polarity. It too needs to be set in historical context, and seen for what it is, a product of the particular context of the twentieth century, starting with the split between the moderate and revolutionary factions of the socialist movement in I9I4. The costs of this division are evident enough, and it would be desirable, in the aftermath of the collapse of the revolutionary socialist models, to re-examine it (Therborn I989). Part of this re-examination would involve a questioning of the automatic antinomy of reform and revolution present in much contemporary and recent writing, and of the assumed contradictory relation of revolutionary ideas to those of another critical, and internationalist, trend produced by modernity: liberalism. This has immediate implications for the discussion in this book. In particular, it relates to an issue that is widely present in contemporary academic and political discussion, but that writers on revolution tend to avoid, namely the question of rights. The language of rights was long denounced by the left, and its revolutionary part, as a bourgeois myth, except where it was for tactical reasons deemed pertinent to use it, as with regard to workers' rights, or the right of nations to selfdetermination. The record of the revolutionary tradition, once it came to power, is a very mixed one: a strong commitment to certain social and economic rights, whose abolition by neoliberal policies many in the former Communist states regret; and a sustained, cruel and dogmatic denial of political rights, collective and individual. Yet the program of rights embodied in national, regional and international codes is, as much as any flamboyant radicalism, both a critique and a program that confronts the contemporary world. Faced with the record of the Communist tradition on rights on the one hand, and the aspirations of liberalism on the other, this disdain for rights, and the related adherence to a denunciation of reformism and liberalism, should be questioned. Invocations of a romanticized I968, of the nicer cases of armed struggle, or of Seattle may be fine for mobilization: they are not a serious answer to the problems of the contemporary world.

#### An incommensurable subject position will not produce a *negative* revolutionary politics. Historical evidence from decolonization proves their alternative is an ideological fantasy.

Neil **LAZARUS** English & Comparative Literary Studies @ Warwick **’11** *The Postcolonial Unconscious* p. 163-177

Now one could argue that while Fanon is certainly right to insist that decolonisation is 'always a violent phenomenon' - 'always', because colonisation is always a violent phenomenon; nowhere in the colonial world was independence ever won without tremendous struggle on the part of the colonised - his theories concerning the centrality and, indeed, indispensability of violence in securing decolonisation are more readily applicable to settler formations than to 'administrative' colonies. In the former, it almost always proved necessary for the native population to resort to armed struggle to obtain independence; in the latter, independence was often achieved on the basis of 'negotiation' rather than the revolutionary overthrow of the recalcitrant colonial order. Is Fanon's theory then to be understood as grounding or presuming a distinction between decolonisation in settler and administrative colonies, such that the former, because of the revolutionary violence upon which it is predicated, tends to lead to 'a higher or purer form of independence'? The problem here is that if we look at developments since independence, there seems little correlation between the level of violence entailed in the liberation struggle and the subsequent success or failure of the revolution. National liberation won on the basis of armed struggle has not necessarily been stronger or more resilient or more deeply sedimented in popular consciousness than liberation secured on the basis of a negotiated transfer of power. (Nor necessarily weaker or less resilient, of course.) The accumulated examples of, say, Cuba, Nicaragua, Algeria, Vietnam, Zimbabwe, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, on the one hand, and India, Tunisia, Jamaica, Ghana, and Senegal, on the other, do not enable a clear-cut pattern to be discerned in this respect.

Macey quotes Francis Jeanson, philosopher, editor of the original French edition of Peau noire, masques blancs, subsequently an activist courageously committed to the cause of Algerian liberation, and author of La Revolution algerienne (1962), who wrote in 1965 that Fanon 'had a "terrible need" to take the most radical option and to reject any form of action that did not have an immediate influence on the direction of the struggle' (A Life, p. 303). This is a damaging assessment, which, if admitted, would certainly go some way towards accounting for the voluntarist tenor of some of Fanon' s ideas and formulations. Macey mentions the dreadful mistake over Angola, for instance, where, quite largely at Fanon's insistence, the FLN resolved to lend the weight of its support (as one of the best established and internationally most influential of anticolonial liberation movements) to Roberto Holden's Frente Nacional de Libertarao de Ango la, celebrating both the brutality of FNLA cadres' premature, poorly conceived and ill-prepared assault on Portuguese settlers in 1961 and Holden's refusal, on racial grounds, to merge the FNLA with the mulatto-led Movimento Popular de Libertarao de Angola, whose popular support and strategic intelligence greatly exceeded that of the FNLA. 'I know Holden is inferior to the MPLA men', Fanon conceded. 'But Holden is ready to begin and they are not. And I am convinced that what is necessary is to begin, and that an Angolan revolutionary movement will be formed in the ensuing struggle' (qtd Macey, A Life, p. 391). 'Overconfident and over-optimistic', Macey writes, 'insisting on "beginning now", and convinced that the Algerian model of the uprisings of 1956 could be exported to a country of which they had little concrete knowledge', Fanon and his colleagues in the FLN 'made a disastrous political miscalculation' (p. 392). The Portuguese forces in Angola responded to the FNLA attacks by killing as many as 20,000 Angolans in terroristic reprisals. Moreover, the division within the anticolonial front took years to mend, drastically undermining the effectivity of the resistance.21

Fanon's voluntarism derives not from his advocacy of violence, but from what I have elsewhere called his 'messianism' - his tendency to assume the unity and coordinated political will of the masses of the Algerian population in contexts where it could not realistically have been supposed to exist (and where in historical restrospect it can in fact be demonstrated not to have existed). Macey speaks in this respect of Fanon's 'idealization' of the Algerian peasantry (A Life, pp. 483-4), and suggests illuminatingly that he sometimes 'mistook temporary changes born of extraordinary circumstances for a permanent revolution' (p. 406). Fanon dearly misread the mass recruitment of the Algerian peasantry to the FLN as testifying to their embrace of the FLN' s platform. In The Wretched of the Earth, thus, he spoke of the 'upward thrust of the people', who had 'decided, in the name of the whole continent, to weigh in strongly against the colonial regime'; and, with reference to Africa at large, he eulogised the 'coordinated effort on the part of two hundred and fifty million men to triumph over stupidity, hunger, and inhumanity at the same time' (p. 164). Such formulations, which seemed implausible even at the time, cannot withstand scrutiny in hindsight. The point is that developments in the immediate postcolonial era cannot be reconciled with Fanon's evocation of a disciplined and progressively unified population coming closer and closer to self-knowledge as the struggle against the French colonial forces intensified. For it seems inconceivable that, having been decisively and world-historically conscientised during the anticolonial struggle (as Fanon claims they had been), Algerians would have permitted themselves to be so easily and so quickly neutralised after decolonisation. The truth would rather seem to be chat even when it was fighting under the FLN's leadership, the Algerian peasantry was never fully committed to the secular, socialist vision projected by the movement. (Macey suggests, in fact, that Fanon also tended to gloss over significant and, in the event, portentous divisions within the FLN itself.) Thus Ian Clegg's claim, on the basis of his research into peasant politics and state formation in Algeria in the years following independence in 1962, that The involvement of the population of the traditional rural areas in the independence struggle must be clearly separated from their passivity in face of its revolutionary afrermath. The peasants were fighting for what they regarded as their inheritance; a heritage firmly rooted in the Arab, Berber, and Islamic past. Their consciousness was rooted in the values and traditions of this past, and their aim was thus re-creation.

Clegg's analysis enables us to account both for the Algerian peasantry's commitment to the struggle for independence, on the one hand, and, on the other, for its lack of concerted militancy in the face of the FLN's (antisocialist) policies of the years immediately following decolonisation, when '[n]either the peasantry nor the subproletariat played any other than a purely negative role in the events' (Clegg, 'Workers and Managers', p. 239). The general theoretical conclusion to be drawn here has been spelled out, in a different context, by the American academic James C. Scott as follows: [Peasant] resistance ... begins ... close to the ground, rooted firmly in the homely but meaningful realities of daily experience ... The values resisters are defending are equally near at hand and familiar. Their point of departure is the practices and norms that have proven effective in the past and appear to offer some promise of reducing or reversing the losses they suffer. The goals of resistance are as modest as its values. The poor strive to gain work, land, and income; they are not aiming at large historical abstractions such as socialism ... Even when such slogans as 'socialism' take hold among subordinate classes; they are likely to mean something radically different to the rank and file than to the radical intelligentsia. 23 In this light, Clegg's complaint that Fanon 'lacks a critical and dialectical analysis of the process of the formation of consciousness' ('Workers and Managers', p. 239) rings as plausible and judicibus. For Fanon's formulations are consistently intellectualist in tone, often phrasing subaltern thought and practice in the elitist-idealist vocabulary of negation, abstract totalisation, and self-actualisation.

#### Cap is good for global quality of life and reducing structural violence.

Lacono 16 (Corey, A student at the University of Rhode Island studying Pharmaceutical Science and Economics, “How Capitalism and Globalization Have Made the World a Better Place,” Quillette, January 16, 2016, http://quillette.com/2016/01/16/how-capitalism-and-globalization-have-made-the-world-a-better-place)

Just kidding, that’s not what happened at all. In fact, as the world has become more capitalist and more globalized, the quality of life for the average person, and especially for the average poor person, has increased substantially. In 1990, 37% of the global population lived on less than $1.90 per day. By 2012, that number had been reduced to 12.8%, and in 2015 it was under 10%. The source of this progress isn’t a massive wealth redistribution program; it’s massive wealth creation — that is, economic growth. Economists David Dollar and Aart Kraay found that, in a global sample of over 100 countries, changes in the income growth of the bottom 40% of the world’s income earners are highly correlated with economic growth rates. On the other hand, changes in inequality contributed relatively little to changes in social welfare of the poor over the last few decades. There is good reason to believe that the expansion of free trade, facilitated by international organizations like the World Trade Organization (WTO) and its predecessor, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), have had a considerable impact in accelerating the economic development of developing countries. In the 1990s GATT facilitated reforms which moved 125 countries towards freer trade by reducing the burden of government imposed trade barriers like tariffs. This was the first serious attempt at trade reform for most developing countries at the time, and arguably presents a unique natural experiment on the economic effects of trade reform. In fact, a paper published by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), specifically examined how trade reforms facilitated by GATT affected the economic development of the reforming countries. In the paper, the authors compared the trends in economic growth before and after trade reform in the reforming countries. Then they compared those results to trends in economic growth of a control group of countries which didn’t undergo trade reform. What they found was very encouraging for proponents of free trade. Prior to reform, the economic development of reformers and non-reformers was practically identical, but after reform, the economic development of reforming countries accelerated while non-reforming countries saw their economies stagnate and decline. The results suggest that the reforms towards freer trade lead to an increase in income per capita of around 20% in the long-run, an effect so large that it almost certainly had a positive and non-trivial impact on poverty reduction. Similarly, other research has shown that more free market trade policies result in lower rates of extreme poverty and child mortality in developing countries. There are other benefits as well. One study on trade reform in Indonesia found that reductions of import tariffs led to an increase in disposable income among poor households, which allowed them to pull their children out of the labor force, leading to “a strong decline” in the incidence of child labor. Unfortunately, many activists have reflexively taken up the cause of opposing the expansion of global capitalism, for a number of reasons. Western anti-sweatshop activists, for example, will often argue in favor of government imposed barriers to trade with poor countries because their working conditions are terrible in comparison to those in developed Western nations. In their view, western consumers should not be promoting a cycle of capitalist exploitation by buying products made in Vietnamese sweat-shops. But satisfactory working conditions aren’t the natural state of mankind; they are a consequence of decades of economic development. Erecting barriers to trade with poor countries is surely a large impediment to their development, in fact, research suggests that existing developed world tariffs depress economic growth rates in the developing world by 0.6 to 1.6 percent per person, a considerably large effect. Moreover, the sweat-shops which produce clothing for Westerners are often much better than alternative forms of domestic employment. In poor countries like Bangladesh, China, and Vietnam, the apparel industry consistently pays more than most other domestic industries. According to research by economist Ben Powell, in poor countries “most sweatshop jobs provide an above average standard of living for their workers.” Notably, a paper published in the Journal of Development Economics found that the expansion of the garments industry in Bangladesh lead to an increase in employment and income among young women, giving them the means to finance their own education. Remarkably the authors found that, “the demand for education generated through manufacturing growth appears to have a much larger effect on female educational attainment compared to a large-scale government conditional cash transfer program to encourage female schooling.” Foreign investment is also more desirable than opponents of capitalism and globalization give it credit for. The conventional wisdom among activists in wealthy countries is that multinational corporations exploit poor workers in third world countries for cheap labor, profiting off people working in sweatshop conditions. It should come as a surprise to the individuals who hold this view to learn that 85% of people in developing countries believe that foreign companies building factories in their countries is a good thing, according to Pew Research. In fact, for all the talk of exploitative multinational corporations, research shows that, in general, these corporations provide higher wages and better working conditions than domestic employers in developing countries. Additionally, when multinational corporations build factories in poor countries, it raises the demand for low-skilled workers, resulting in higher wages for local workers. Consistent with this fact, recent empirical evidence demonstrates that investment by foreign companies in developing countries reduces both poverty and income inequality by raising the incomes of low-skilled workers. Foreign investment can also make people in relatively low-income countries better off by providing better or more inexpensive products. A recent analysis published by the NBER found that foreign retailers like Wal-Mart greatly reduce the cost of living for both the rich and poor in Mexico, making everyone along the income distribution better off. Global capitalism is by no means a perfect phenomenon. Many businesses do have questionable labor practices that are worthy of contempt. And free market policies may in many instances lead to socially undesirable outcomes, sometimes on a large scale. However, the one-dimensional, automatic denunciation of capitalism and the accompanying refusal to give it any credit for its successes — as social media activists have done — reflects an uncompromising, and quite frankly ignorant worldview. It is one in which capitalism is always bad, no matter what the evidence tells us.

#### Ethical positions are insufficient – using political tools to break down monopoly through antitrust is necessary.

Vaheesan ’19 [Sandeep; Legal Director @ Open Markets Institute, JD @ Duke; “The Profound Nonsense of Consumer Welfare Antitrust,” *The Antitrust Bulletin* 1(16); AS]

III. The False Naturalization of the Market

A market economy is a state-constructed institution. Government action establishes the foundational rules of an economy—rules without which an economy cannot function. Among other things, government at different levels creates property rights, enforces contracts, charters corporations, issues money, awards copyrights and trademarks, and establishes consumer and worker rights. Antitrust rules are part of this dense layer of rules that enable and shape market activity. Despite frequent invocations of “free markets” and the “private sector” in public discourse, a market does not emerge spontaneously but depends on extensive state action.

The Supreme Court and the DOJ and the FTC, explicitly or implicitly, suppress the constitutive function of state action. Instead, in line with the paradigm of the law and economics school in general, they rely on a false conception of the market. The Court and the agencies treat existing market arrangements as somehow natural or efficient and view antitrust as exogenous government intervention that should be circumscribed. Rather than treat antitrust law as part of the stateconstructed system of market rules, judges and enforcers view antitrust as an incursion on the Edenic marketplace.

A. The State Construction of the Market

Government, at federal and state levels, establishes the conditions and rules necessary for a market to function. It creates and protects property rights, enforces contracts, charters corporations, and issues money. These are illustrative and just some examples of the state structuring and governance of the market. Without these rules and a coercive authority to enforce them, a market activity could not exist, let alone flourish. In other words, a market economy is not and cannot be “free” but is instead constructed through government action.

The state defines and enforces rules of property. The state decides what qualifies as property and offers holders of property rights, whether in land or over intangibles, the right to call on coercive state action when their interest has been infringed. And the question of what constitutes property is not stable. State action has both narrowed and broadened property. For example, the Civil War and the ratification of the 13th Amendment abolished and outlawed slavery—property rights in human beings.31 In other ways, the state has expanded the scope of property. Property over intangibles has expanded over the course of American history. For example, Congress and the courts have broadened the subject matter entitled to exclusivity rights32 and extended the length of copyright terms.33 The Supreme Court in Goldberg v. Kelly in 1970 recognized that the meaning of property is indeterminate and that common law conceptions are not preserved in an amber encasement for eternity.34

The government also facilitates the making of contracts. Courts stand ready to enforce contracts and award relief in the event one party fails to fulfill its commitments and breaches the contract. Without this coercive power, contracts would not carry the force of law. In ruling that racially restrictive covenants in housing are unconstitutional, the Supreme Court described how the purportedly private world of contract is backed by public power. The Court stated:

These are not cases, as has been suggested, in which the States have merely abstained from action, leaving private individuals free to impose such discriminations as they see fit. Rather, these are cases in which the States have made available to such individuals the full coercive power of government to deny to petitioners, on the grounds of race or color, the enjoyment of property rights in premises which petitioners are willing and financially able to acquire and which the grantors are willing to sell.35

Courts also withhold enforcement of other contracts. For instance, in many states, credit contracts with interest rates in excess of the state cap are unenforceable.36 Similarly, the State of California bars the judicial enforcement of noncompete clauses against workers.37

Market governance is not and cannot be neutral

. In addition to being illustrative of how state action constructs a market, property and contract show how the state decides who wields power in the economy. The government through property, contract, tort, banking regulation, consumer protection, and numerous other areas of law not only sets the rules of the game but also allocates who has enforceable rights.

In expanding or narrowing legal rights, the government decides who possesses power and who does not. Workers who can organize boycotts and sympathy strikes have much greater power to unionize firms and industries and reach favorable terms with employers than workers who do not possess this right, such as American workers at present. Similarly, consider state law on noncompete clauses. A state that enforces noncompete clauses against workers tilts the balance of power in the employment relationship in favor of employers, relative to a state that does not enforce these restraints.

Against this background of market-creating state action, antitrust modifies existing legal entitlements and redistributes power within the economy. It reconfigures state construction of the economy. The late antitrust scholar John Flynn situated antitrust against this background of state action and wrote:

Antitrust policy should be viewed as it originally was in the legislative history of the antitrust laws and the Addyston Pipe & Steel case as part of the fundamental laws defining the scope of property and contract rights, rather than as a bothersome limitation upon the unfettered right to invoke the community’s law to exercise such rights.38

Consider two important ways in which antitrust reshapes common law legal entitlements. First, antitrust limits the ways in which property holders can acquire and use these legal entitlements. For example, the Clayton Act abridges the right of businesses to acquire the property rights of competing or otherwise related businesses.39 In limiting the property rights of some entities, it grants greater freedom to customers, suppliers, and others affected by the power associated with concentrated property holdings. Second, the antitrust laws limit the scope of contract law. The Sherman Act prohibits contracts that restraint trade or monopolize markets. For instance, it prohibits price-fixing contracts that raise or lower prices.40 In limiting the contractual freedom of certain parties, the Sherman Act protects, for instance, consumers from unduly high prices for essentials and workers from unfairly low wages for their labor.41

Antitrust law is analogous to nuisance law. Nuisance law restricts how property owners exercise their rights—for example, by prohibiting the operation of furnaces that produce noxious fumes that are carried downstream by the wind—to protect other property owners’ right of quiet enjoyment on their land. In a similar vein, antitrust law restricts the liberty of powerful actors to use their property rights as they wish and thereby protects the property rights and liberty of others. Like nuisance, antitrust law does not abridge rights categorically but instead reallocates them, limiting the discretionary power of corporations and enhancing the freedom of consumers, sellers, small firms, and rivals.

B. The Supreme Court and Federal Court Naturalize the Common Law Rules of the Market

In adopting and implementing consumer welfare antitrust, the Supreme Court and the antitrust agencies have naturalized the legal construction of the market. Much of this has been implicit. Their embrace of consumer welfare meant an embrace of the law and economics ideology that asserts self-regulating markets in which the state “intervenes” after the fact, for better or for worse. Against this background of a natural market and natural common law rules, antitrust is treated as a “statist” encroachment that should be treated skeptically and circumscribed. While this market naturalization is generally implicit in antitrust opinions and guidance documents, the FTC does surface it in its competition advocacy work and reveals its belief in an Edenic, prepolitical marketplace.

The law and economics ideology that has informed contemporary antitrust submerges the state action underlying a market economy. Indeed, law and economics has more deeply shaped antitrust than any other field of law. The framework of law and economics posits a market preexisting the state. The market emerges as a force of nature. The state follows and intervenes in response to discrete market failures in which existing markets do not conform to certain textbook criteria (the optimistic view of the state) or in response to political pressures from well-connected individuals and organizations (the pessimistic view of the state). In this framework, the legal construction of the existing market and economy is erased.

#### The aff cedes the law – a positive program is key to link together different areas of power inequalities.

Jedidiah **BRITTON-PURDY** Law @ Columbia ET AL ‘**20** (Additional Authors David Singh Grewal, Amy Kapczynski & Sabeel Rahman) “Building a Law-and-Political Economy Framework: Beyond the Twentieth-Century Synthesis”, 129 YALE L. J. 1784 (2020) p.1831-1835

In synthesizing these last two points, we might say that two criteria define a properly democratic political economy. First, the political community must be able to assert its collective will over the economic order, not be blocked from doing so by the antipolitics of efficiency-focused adjudication or technocracy. Second, the substance of economic life must support democratic self-rule by ensuring substantial equality, freedom from abjection and dependence, a workplace experience of dignity and self-assertion rather than vulnerability and humiliation, and the capacity to build power through institutions such as unions. A democratic political economy must be answerable to its citizens' rule, and it must produce citizens capable of ruling it.

Third, a commitment to democracy demands that we experiment with alternatives to the prevailing technologies of elite governance, particularly in the regulatory state itself. Instead of viewing state bureaucracy as a domain of apolitical expertise (or of malevolent capture and corruption), we might reconceive regulatory bodies as sites of democratic contestation.162 If purportedly neutral and technocratic visions for rationalizing governance are neither neutral nor, in practice, rationalizing, we need new conceptions of how to democratically discipline administrative decisions. What would processes of administrative accountability look like if they were wise to dynamics of power and animated by a commitment to more genuine equality? There is a dynamic scholarly agenda here, already under construction. We might explore, for example, means to bring representatives of affected communities to participate in administrative decision-making, aiming at modalities of democratic voice that could meet our needs for both (a broadened conception) of expertise and for institutionalized forms of countervailing power.163 There is a rich history of social movements engaging and seeking to remake the regulatory state in a more inclusive, but still effective, way.164 A democratic political economy compels us to revisit and build on this tradition. Like many of the cases we have advanced here, the substance of these arguments lies in political morality. A democratic political economy is a moral project, aimed at taking with full seriousness the equality of persons and our capacity to set for ourselves the terms of our collective lives, to decide how to deal out power and vulnerability, to figure out how to live together - and to defend these decisions to one another. When we follow Karl Polanyi in speaking of an economy "embedded" in society,165 we mean not just that economic ordering is always derived from legal ordering but also that an economy's ordering of power and vulnerability always bespeaks a moral vision of persons, whether egalitarian and generous or hierarchical and cramped.

Thus, scholarship should consider what moral images of social and political order are implied in a given legal patterning. What image of economic citizenship, or of a democratic economy, is embedded in a Brandeisian antitrust regime or in a labor law that assumes workers are involved in governing the workplace? In what ways is democracy or political membership hollowed out when replaced by the increasingly libertarian and wealth-maximizing premises of the Synthesis? Do "private-law" regimes here constitute citizens as market subjects who could demand a different kind of equality in these domains? What is revealed about the racialization of political membership by racial patterns of property ownership and loss, about gendered citizenship by the ways that the burdens of social reproduction interact with the wage bargain?166 Once the legal constitution of the economy is taken to be centrally about the production and enforcement of inequality, these questions present themselves naturally.

CONCLUSION

The Twentieth-Century Synthesis was a successful remaking of the legal imagination, creating a neoliberal political economy premised on concepts of efficiency, neutrality, and antipolitics. But even as this was a successful intellectual shift, manifesting in a wide range of scholarly discourses, doctrinal areas, and policy changes, it has always been a fragile configuration. As the contradictions of an increasingly unequal political economy have become painfully visible and exacerbated, the veneer of consensus around this Synthesis has fallen away. Thus, we find ourselves in a moment of political crisis and accompanying intellectual upheaval: an old order of political economy and its legitimating concepts are crumbling, but a new order has yet to emerge. The outlines of the battle for a new order have come into focus. The populisms of the far right, resurgent across the globe, point to one dark path coming out of this moment: the resurgence of reactionary political economy that marries anger at economic and political corruption with exclusionary attachment to racialized and gendered hierarchy. At the same time, centrist calls for a restoration of an imagined pre-2016 consensus on norms of good governance ignore the deeper causes of neoliberalism's crisis. But in contrast to both of these visions, the account offered here points to the beginnings of a very different, more deeply democratic and progressive political economy.

To embrace the possibility of democratic renewal requires rejecting the terms of the Twentieth-Century Synthesis. We believe that the legal realists-and thinkers in a much longer history of political thought-were right in believing that "the economy" is neither self-defining nor self-justifying. The emphasis in these traditions has been the right one: on power, distribution, and the need for legitimacy as the central themes in the organization of economic life. Moreover, precisely because economic ordering is a political and legal artifact, the idea of an "autonomous" economic domain has always been obscurantist and ideological, even when accepted in good faith. 167

Law does not and never could simply defer to such a realm. Rather, law is perennially involved in creating and enforcing the terms of economic ordering, most particularly through the creation and maintenance of markets. One of its most important roles, indeed, is determining who is subject to market ordering and on what terms and who is exempted in favor of other kinds of protection or provision. 168 Thus the program of law, politics, and institution building often called "neoliberalism" is, and can only be, a specific theory of how to use state power, to what ends, and for whose benefit. 169 The ideological work of the Twentieth-Century Synthesis has been to naturalize and embed in legal institutions from the Supreme Court to the Antitrust Office and World Trade Organization a specific disposition of power**.** This power represents a deployment of market ordering that produces intense and cross-cutting forms of inequality and democratic erosion. However, Twentieth-Century Synthesis theorists tend not to see this, precisely because the Synthesis makes it so hard to see (or at least so easy to overlook).

If it is to succeed, law and political economy will also require something beyond mere critique. It will require a positive agenda. Many new and energized voices, from the legal academy to political candidates to movement activists, are already building in this direction,170 calling for and giving shape to programs for more genuine democracy that also takes seriously questions of economic power and racial subordination;1 7 1 more equal distribution of resources and life chances;172 more public and shared resources and infrastructures; 73 the displacement of concentrated corporate power and rooting of new forms of worker power;174 the end of mass incarceration and broader contestation of the long history of the criminalization and control of poor people and people of color in building capitalism; 175 the recognition of finance and money as public infrastructures; 176 the challenges posed by emerging forms of power and control arising from new technologies;177 and the need for a radical new emphasis on ecology. 178 These are the materials from which a positive agenda, over time, will be built.

Political fights interact generatively with scholarly and policy debates in pointing the way toward a more democratic political economy. The emergence of new grassroots movements, campaigns, and proposals seeking to deepen our democracy is no guarantee of success. But their prevalence and influence make clear the dangers and opportunities of this moment of upheaval- and highlight the stakes of building a new legal imaginary.1 7 9 Neoliberal political economy, with its underlying commitments to efficiency, neutrality, and antipolitics, helped animate, shape, and legitimate a twentieth-century consensus that erased power, encased the market, and reinscribed racialized, economic, and gendered inequities. By contrast, a legal imaginary of democratic political economy, that takes seriously underlying concepts of power, equality, and democracy, can inform a wave of legal thought whose critique and policy imagination can amplify and accelerate these movements for structural reform- and, if we are lucky, help remake our polity in more deeply democratic ways. 175.

#### Liberalism isn’t monolithic – abandoning institutions is materially violent

Badano 14 (Gabriele. PhD Candidate, Centre for Philosophy, Justice, and Health, University College London. “Political liberalism and the justice claims of the disabled: a reconciliation.” Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 17(4): 401-22. Emory Libraries.)

I argue that any proposal abandoning the language of political justice would not seem to do enough for those individuals with disabilities who fall outside the basic idea of persons as depicted by Rawls. In fact, the intuitions supporting the idea that concepts like rights and opportunities are indispensable are very strong.11 Let us go back to the examples of individuals falling outside Rawls’s idea of persons because their disabilities prevent them from being a net beneﬁt to social cooperation. They are individuals who need multiple careers to work, or whose disabilities prevent them from providing a beneﬁt to social cooperation that is large enough. To put the point more sharply, it is worth noticing that the disabilities in question are compatible with being in full possession of one’s logical and moral powers. Now, should we accept that those individuals ought to be given no rights or opportunities? An afﬁrmative answer would strike us as implausible, and for a good reason. In a liberal society, having one’s rights, opportunities and basic distributive entitlements acknowledged is one and the same as being recognized as an equal. And what is missing from Rawls’s political liberalism is precisely the idea that falling below a threshold of full cooperation should not be enough to prevent the disabled from being regarded as persons on an equal footing with anyone else.

In sum, Rawls’s political liberalism is not amenable to any extension that, keeping the basic ideas of society and persons intact, is able to include a concern with the status of individuals with disabilities. In addition, the proposal that the interests of the disabled are not for public reason to protect is not satisfactory. Consequently, a substantial revision is the only way to reconcile political liberalism with our intuitions concerning what is due to the disabled.

5. Revising political liberalism I: beyond Hartley’s contractualism

The aim of this section and the next is to propose a substantial revision of Rawls’s theory that accommodates the justice claims of the disabled while upholding the project of political liberalism. A question that needs to be answered at this point is: why should we uphold the project of political liberalism, rather than endorsing a different model that more neatly ﬁts with our intuitions concerning what is due to the disabled? First, the general project of political liberalism is compelling. Rawls’s political liberalism aims to identify a common ground of political ideas that can work as the basis on which the most important political decisions should be made. This project is of the greatest importance because, if successful, it creates legitimacy by building institutions on the basis of concepts that are acceptable to each reasonable individual. Moreover, it promotes stability in societies that are characterized by deep pluralism.

Second, despite Rawls’s failure to take the interests of the disabled into consideration, political liberalism is well suited to support the justice claims of individuals with disabilities. This is because the idea that the disabled are citizens who deserve our respect is part of the common culture of our societies. In other words, there is an overlapping consensus on the idea that rights, opportunities and distributive shares must be granted to individuals who are not fully cooperating members of society, including those who fall below full moral powers. It is widely believed that those with physical disabilities should have the same rights as their fellow citizens, live in a social environment that does not excessively limit their opportunities and receive beneﬁts that help meet their special needs. Besides, although the state or third parties are given exceptional rights to interfere with the autonomy of individuals with severe cognitive disabilities, it is widely recognized that the mentally disabled are citizens whose basic interests must be protected by the law.12 In the public space, any proposal that individuals who are not fully cooperating members of society should have their basic interests neglected would be widely received with outrage. Such proposal would be said to ﬁt a fascist society, not a decent one. Among other legal documents, the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UN General Assembly, A/61/611) can be taken as the epitome of this widespread attitude. Adopted in 2006, the Convention requires that all individuals with disabilities should share in the enjoyment of equal fundamental rights.

# 2NC

#### But, mutual aid does not have to be mutually exclusive with the institution of work. The aff’s rejection of the “formal economy” forecloses the possibility of transforming community care into meaningful work.

Schlanger 20

(Zoë Schlanger, 5-7-2020, environment reporter based in New York. "Turn Mutual Aid Into Meaningful Work," Dissent Magazine, <https://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/turn-mutual-aid-into-meaningful-work>, JKS)

When people ask me, as a climate reporter, what I think will happen next, my answer has been cruel and blasé in its bluntness: “More pandemics.” There will be more pandemics, driven by deforestation, habitat destruction, and disease vectors extended due to warming climates, all egged on in their spread by the global nature of our economy. We also know there will be an increase in other kinds of climate disasters: wildfire, drought, hurricane, flood. The future is pocked with relentless catastrophe. As of now, we have nowhere near the workforce needed to respond to this new reality. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) was already running short on staff by April, with only the coronavirus on its hands. With the wildfire and hurricane seasons both set to peak over the summer, overlapping crises are inevitable, but there isn’t a plan for how to cope. “It’s an unimaginably complex set of problems,” Irwin Redlener, a physician and the director of the National Center for Disaster Preparedness at Columbia University, told me in an interview for the New York Times in early April. He wondered what would happen if New Orleans was hit with a storm surge; at the time, it was becoming one of the cities hardest hit by coronavirus. “I’m just cringing to think of what happens,” he said. “This is one of those questions we haven’t even thought about yet. . . . I think we’re out of steam.” Elsewhere, though, we have steam in abundance. In her 2009 book A Paradise Built in Hell, Rebecca Solnit recounts the phenomenon of mutual aid that emerges in the wake of disasters. I read that book the year before Hurricane Sandy struck New York and then watched as its thesis came alive in hard-hit neighborhoods like the Rockaways. My friends with cars shuttled other friends to parking lots near the beach to deliver prescriptions and hand out food. Today, mutual aid has returned. Everyone I know is joining neighborhood aid groups, getting trained to make deliveries and welfare checks. Most of them are newly unemployed. The relief at having a sense of purpose is palpable. The logic is reflexive, simple, obvious: when disaster strikes, we learn how to take care of each other. And it feels incredibly good to do. What if that drive to care could be the new meaning and substance of work at a mass scale? Saket Soni, the longtime labor organizer and founder of the National Guestworker Alliance, has lately put his focus on advocating for a “resilience force”—a New Deal–style federal jobs program designed to staff disaster recovery efforts. He and his colleagues at Resilience Force originally imagined their initiative as a response to wreckage caused by climate change. Crucially, it would do away with the citizenship requirement currently barring non-citizen workers from joining FEMA’s ranks. Already, the workers hired in places like coastal Florida to rebuild after storms tend to be undocumented, and as the New York Times has reported, they are prone to abuse by their employers, who can withhold pay without consequence. These workers are crucial to recovery; they’re often the first to arrive to scenes of devastation. They cart away the rubble. When the pandemic struck, it was obvious that the same structure ought to encompass jobs to respond to this type of disaster, too. “We think that’s really the missing piece in the American recovery plan, and business leaders agree that it’s necessary. Every industry on the front lines is talking about the labor shortage,” Soni told me recently. One of the roles he envisions for the resilience force reminds me of the mutual aid groups currently operating in nearly every New York City neighborhood. He pictures a new fleet of community health workers who would do welfare checks and guide people to medical resources they need, relieving pressure on the overwhelmed healthcare system. “It’s a very broad role, but it’s a rigorous role. People are already doing it; caring for each other,” he said. Another role would be an “emergency navigator,” modeled after the jobs of those hired in the Obama era to navigate insurance exchange portals. “They would figure out how to get your FEMA check, or an assessment on your broken roof.” Coastal areas are already home to people who, after previous storms, became experts in these byzantine systems out of necessity. Once one imagines the government as an employer that turns mutual aid into meaningful work, it’s not hard to imagine it also employing thousands of people to transition the country off of fossil fuels, too. As Kate Aronoff wrote in the New Republic, these jobs would be meaningful beyond providing a reliable paycheck: They “could provide an alternative to low-paid work bound up in carbon-intensive supply chains like those at McDonald’s and Walmart—currently the only employment on offer in many communities around the country.” In 1915, Louis Brandeis, still a year away from his appointment to the U.S. Supreme Court, said that life in an industrial nation ought to support “living not existing.” Work should be stable, safe, and well-paid enough to leave the worker with the “freshness of mind” to be able to “work at some thing besides breadwinning.” While he was speaking about having sufficient leisure time to meaningfully pursue self-education, I can’t help but connect it to the “freshness of mind” so clearly being experienced by my friends suddenly finding purpose in community work. Yes, give us the time to self-educate. But what if the work itself could support a state of “living not existing” too? Community care as formal employment seems obviously necessary in the face of a disaster-prone future. It might also feel a hell of a lot better than any large-scale employment on the table now.

# 1NR

## Markets K

### 1NR – Markets K

#### We must call for state responsibility for social provisioning and care. An economics of *collective* well-being must break with the neoliberal minimalist state.

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In chapter 2 we used excerpts from 'Bread and Roses' to signal themes that we considered central to the dilemmas that women face as they strive to provision for those with whom they have relationships, of responsibility. The fact that these well-known words are meaningful today signals the troubling persistence of the shape of work in women's lives. Bread is needed, and thus so are the means for acquiring it; the procurement of resources through precarious employment, demeaning social assistance requirements, and the informal labour market of many participants meant 'sweating from birth until life closes' just to make ends meet. However, participants also talked about the work they did that was associated with other dimensions of the provisioning responsibilities that they carried: the hours spent doing caring labour, volunteer work, maintaining health, ensuring safety, and making claims for themselves and others. These are documented, often in graphic detail, in the preceding chapters. This work, and the social significance of it, is far more than is usually captured under the apparently polar opposite terms of breadwinner and caring. As the data reveal, the former is but a small part of the work women do. Incorporating caregiving into the picture contributes to an important conceptual expansion. Nevertheless, much of the range and complexity of women's work remained below the surface, unnamed and undocumented. The research that informs this book set out to map this territory in some detail.

To pry open the concept of work, its meaning and worth, from the confines of the market, we began with the concept of provisioning, a term retrieved from an earlier approach to economics that focused on how humans materially provided for themselves. This wider approach to economics contrasts with its current definition as the allocation of scarce resources to satisfy wants within a market economy. Feminist economists such as Nelson (1993) and Power (2004) have revitalized the term to expose all the work that women do that is uncounted in the market economy. An important assumption in these writings is that such work is central, not peripheral, to economic life in the older sense of the word.(Figart, 2007). Caring labour, household labour, and volunteer work are arenas of activity that have so far received the most documentation. To go beyond these established arenas into more unexplored areas, we followed pathways of responsibilities associated with relationship trails as we recorded individual and collective provisioning work that was connected to family, friends, neighbours, and community organizations.

After a careful assessment of this provisioning terrain, the question remains: so where are the roses? What was envisioned by the marchers as they talked of 'life's glories'? Flow can they be realized? Today such ideas might be captured by phrases such as well-being or quality of life. Admittedly, they are contestable conceptual tools, but they do have the virtue of encompassing more than merely income as measures of desirable outcomes in life. Glimmers of some of the invisible work done by individuals and collectivities of women seen when women's relationships are used as the compass, show the myriad ways in which women contribute to social reproduction, adding value to the lives of those for whom they have taken responsibility. Our point is that these are not sideshows around the central characters of the labour market. If the drama is about quality of life, the storyline consists of activities that are attached to relationships of responsibility, and paid work is one segment of it. Nevertheless, it cannot be ignored that in a market economy paid work is reified and many essentials of life are commodified. The resulting injustice is that having money would have allowed our participants to circumvent a lot of the relentless work they had to do that was not recognized or valued.

The plot thickens as we turn our attention to the script of neoliberal social policies that write off the provisioning of women as a free good,without considering its true costs and benefits. Feminist political economy has issued the proviso that without women's contribution to the economy, the burdens of social reproduction fall disproportionately on marginalized populations, and because the capitalist class benefits from this oppression, the state needs to intervene and support  
  
  
  
 the essential work of women. Our study furthers arguments that the terms of citizenship need to be widened (Howell, 2007; Isin & Nielson, 2008; Plummer, 2004; Stasiulis & Bakan, 2003) in ways that recognize the contributions and agency of women individually and collectively, in private as well as public spaces. Currently, social policies reward the full rights of citizenship to those who are fortunate enough to land the market-player parts - although it could be argued that some of these characters should be cast as villains in the citizenship drama.

The data from the research sites presented in the previous chapters suggest a number of important theoretical ideas that are discussed in this chapter. These we see as ingredients, the nutrients needed if the rose of citizenship is to be realized for women such as the participants in this study. We also indicate in this chapter methodological points that we think were conducive to revealing the many dimensions of provisioning. The chapter concludes by rejecting ideas of citizenship that are limited to market notions of rights and responsibilities and/or that recognize only engagement in formal voluntary organizations as participation in civil society. It presents a model of social provisioning in which the state is positioned as a key player with institutional, economic, and ideological power to shape the lives of its citizens.

Dimensions of Women's Working Lives

In chapter 2 we referred to the range of provisioning responsibilities that women carried. This general term was specified in chapters 3 and 4. In the former we articulated two major domains (activities and strategies), each encompassing six different types of work done by the individuals we interviewed. In chapter 4 the work required to keep community groups going was revealed and organized into three domains. As the quotes highlighted, women's work does not fall into silos, although to facilitate the mapping of this work we classified the data into categories and organized them along dimensions labelled individual and collective provisioning. This approach highlighted the complexity, as well as the amount, of work done, and made visible the fact that, despite neoliberal discourse denying its existence, women carry provisioning responsibilities in collective as well as individual spaces, in public and private spheres. Consider these categories as bookmarks in a provisioning story that needs to be written more fully as the language to describe these domains becomes more accessible to women. As language and concepts are clarified and developed into models, we anticipate that the borders of provisioning domains will be permeable, in several aspects. In each chapter we underlined how the data make visible the existence of pathways, based on relationships of responsibility, between domains of work. This allowed us to track relationships without being stopped at the borders of family and/or paid work. Transgressing these borders revealed a range of relationships that could not be classified validly in one of the traditionally defined family, work, or volunteer spheres rather than another. It was not the sphere that determined the meaning of the relationship but rather the relationship that determined what responsibilities were assumed, how and why provisioning was done. As several of the quotes under transformative strategies suggest, participants speak of the desires and difficulties they face in negotiating their provisioning responsibilities, including those associated with commitment to the goals of the organization. They fulfil the responsibilities that these commitments entail through personal and organizational relationships. These trans-domain pathways follow relationships-, and thus costs and benefits travel along with persons on these pathways (Emirbayer, 1997). These connections must be built into theory and policy models if they are to support women.

Another key finding is a clearer understanding of how current boundaries associated with ideas of public and private spheres are powerful shapers of women's lives. Fortunately, there is now a rich theoretical literature on boundaries (see Howell & Mulligan, 2005; Lamont & Molnar, 2002, for a review; Yuval-Davis & Stoetzler, 2002) that helped in exploring participants' responses. Our point is that women's provisioning requires that women attempt to cross these barriers. As does Dorothy Smith (1990), we argue that these borders and boundaries have presence and power when they are operationalized into policies and programmes and their effects are documented. The analyses in the preceding chapters show how boundaries operate in ways that result in women having to negotiate them - yet another work demand. This work is not a direct provisioning activity but is a necessary strategy to further both individual and collective provisioning. In a neoliberal society the market, state, family, and civil society spheres are real in the sense that there are powerful social structures defining them. The boundaries can be as solid as concrete, requiring determined hammering to get through them (recall in chapter 3 a participant's list of the work she did in response to the questioning of a social assistance official). The boundaries can be spongy, seemingly penetrable, but are impermeable when pushed - as when the grandmother is chastised by her son for taking a mental/physical health break in the form of a walk rather than staying in the house to care for the grandfather. Others can best be compared to fencing where there are openings, but what is on the other side is difficult to discern - one might squeeze through and land on safe ground, or fall into an abyss of the unknown. For example, job training seems to promise a way out of poverty but our data and that of others suggest that it is more often a pathway to dead-end jobs with minimal pay. The work of figuring out the structure of boundaries and strategizing how to cross them is seldom recognized, or it gets named as something else when it is. For instance, finding out what is allowed, or not, under social assistance regulations is dubbed as 'exploiting the system'; setting limits on the demands of family for caring labour is called 'shirking family responsibilities.'

When well-being is equated with the market, employment, and individual consumption choices - and value is measured in dollars, collective spaces as arenas for support and action tend to fade from view. Ways of talking about these spaces - theories that capture their shape and activities - seem unnecessary when the dominant discourse is about markets, choice, and individual responsibility. In chapter 2 we noted how collective spaces where women could come together were disappearing. Funds to support them have diminished in the last decade, and those that remain are tightly hooked to delivering services, with accompanying accountability criteria. All chapters show that services are an important component of the resources that women access to meet their provisioning responsibilities.

Our concern was that the raison d'etre of these organizations was being narrowed to that of a service agency - carrying on functions performed traditionally by the state or voluntary sector. Community capacity-building in any form was being squeezed out as funding criteria favoured short-term service programmes. We have purposefully documented the work that occurs in these spaces, to provide empirical evidence that there is much work in keeping groups going that is not counted in the costs of providing services. However, our concern goes beyond a call to recognize undocumented work, as important as that is. Viewing these events through a critical feminist lens suggests that these collective spaces are being shut down because they counter a market ethos and thus are seen to hinder the efficient operation of a market economy. In fact, it is in these collective spaces that women's provisioning is supported in order to keep individuals from placing even greater demands on the state and the economy. Using a methodology that can document complexity is a critical ingredient in research that is aimed at building theory. While analysing data from multiple sites, one is constantly reminded of its complexity, how different types of provisioning work are related, and how classification schemes will change over time as new data are entered. We agree with McCall (2005) that categories are methodologically useful for documenting complexity - as long as they are recognized as place holders that reflect theoretical assumptions. In chapter 3 we noted how the final categories of provisioning activities and strategies used by participants were the result of coding that started separately within a few sites, followed by the development of cross-site draft categories to be used to code new data in these and the other sites. After all data were collected, two people very familiar with the sites examined codes and content, suggesting final naming for the categories of individual work. The naming of organizational work was also finally determined only after all the data had been collected and community advisory groups had debated the findings. Research team members then agreed upon the naming of the categories. Assuming the position that categories are best regarded as provisional, useful for a period of time, but needing to be modified as phenomena are better understood, the types of provisioning, and their names, done by women as individuals and as members of collectivities will change, we expect, as their breadth and depth become better understood. Furthermore, our understanding of how relationships shape the provisioning responsibilities carried by women is in its infancy. Hopefully the categories - the descriptors we are using, will soon be outgrown as research and theory about women's provisioning grow and mature.

Our choice of sites and approach to analysis were influenced by considerations of important structural inequalities and the effects of 'spheres' and their boundaries on the complexity of the work that women do and the relationships they maintain. Participants were purposefully sampled across six sites to reflect differences in geography, age, income, and organizational type. The women who participated in this research came from very different social locations. They brought to their provisioning responsibilities different priorities, experiences, and identities. The realities they faced differed. A woman of eighty-five with several chronic health conditions had struggles that were different from those of the refugee mother trying to raise a pre-schooler in a high-crime area. Thus, the specifics of their provisioning activities and the strategies they used to provide differed; the collective spaces that they found useful and to which they contributed also differed.

In recent years, the concept of intersectionality has been used to capture how this diversity affects people's lives and actions (see McCall, 2005; Simien, 2007). However, the concept can seem ambiguous, because it has been used in different ways. It is frequently employed to emphasize the fact that individuals have multiple dimensions to their identities, although many are rooted in social structures. For instance, an individual participant in our research might be young and poor, have one child, and be a second-generation immigrant from Jamaica. The attributes used to describe the participant in the previous sentence reflect both the diversity of individuals and the structural dimensions that define privilege and marginalization in Canadian society. However, an individual embodies only some aspects of each. Depending on what these are and how they come together, their relative importance/ influence will differ in people's lives. These intersections affect work and relationships and how they vary across social locations. It is important to articulate in theory and policy which dimensions of privilege and oppression are relevant, and why and determine their relative importance vis-a-vis each other in affecting the quality of life of different groups of citizens.

Challenging Citizenship Claims

Discussions of citizenship reappeared in the eighties as global movements of goods and peoples brought into question the meaning of national borders and the entitlements of those who resided within them. Although this discussion originated in concerns about the meaning and power of nation states when flows of capital no longer recognize national borders, the debate has widened to include what constitutes the basis of citizenship claims and who can claim them. The 'what' is defined in terms of rights and responsibilities, while the 'who' can be found in policies on immigration and refugees (Dobrowolsky, 2008; Yuval-Davis, Anthias, & Kofman, 2005), transient workers (Sharma, 2006), and international caring labour chains (Browne & Braun 2008; Hochschild, 2000b). As the data from Jane's Place (chapter 6) revealed, responsibilities and accompanying funds flow regularly through relationships to kin in other countries. However, since most of the participants in our study were Canadian residents, in the following paragraphs we limit our focus to explicating how their rights and responsibilities were filtered through gendered ideas of what constitutes citizen-like activities.

Marshall's classic post-Second World War articulation of the social rights of citizenship within a welfare state underwent a sea change during the eighties. Marshall's welfare state citizen enjoyed certain entitlements based on the fact that 'he' lived within certain national borders, that 'he' belonged to a nation state. However, Marshall's idea of civil, political, and social rights, despite their social policy strengths, were tied to notions of paid work (Marshall, 1950; Marshall & Botto- more, 1992). State benefits frequently stemmed from this connection. Women's work, particularly unpaid caring labour, is excluded in debates and policies rooted in such a framework (Cohen & Pulkingham, 2009; Lister, 2003).

During the retrenchment of the 1980s, the importance of this exclusion of women's work became pronounced as neoliberal ideology took hold and the idea of an active state, along with funding, retreated. The entitlement-bearing citizen was transformed into a more active citizen, and responsibilities were given more emphasis than rights (see, for example, Etzioni, 1995). The consequences fell disproportionately on women, whether as sole support mothers or as members and staff of different types of publicly funded organizations (Dobrowolsky, 2008; Dobrowolsky & Jenson, 2004; Jenson & Phillips, 2001). The decimation of these organizations resulting from the rise of neoliberalism silenced their critique of its effects on women. Canadian women have won some visibility of their rights over the years - perhaps highlighted by the insertion of equality clauses into the Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982. However, even here, rights and claims focus on the individual. Disappearing in such debates is the responsibility of the state to meet the needs of its citizens. So dominant is the discourse of individual responsibility that it is difficult to see what/who fades from view in such discussions. As chapters 4 and 9 show, collectivities offer critical spaces for women to understand the actions of the state.

The new active citizen is expected to shoulder responsibilities by participating in paid work and in civil society. The effects of this expectation on the well-being of women on social assistance is well documented (Gazso, 2009; Little & Morrison, 1999). In a contorted twist of logic, for those on social assistance who could not find employment, volunteer activity was defined as a substitute arena for participation. However, much formal volunteering privileges a culture characteristic of affluence rather than the informal volunteering that is more characteristic of people with low incomes (Williams, 2003, as cited in Orton, 2006, p. 255). Most of the arenas in which our participants were involved as members and volunteers were viable options for them, because these organizations also provided material resources. In a nutshell, we are arguing that it is only the privileged who can afford to join organizations that do not help citizens meet their practical needs as well as addressing their strategic interests. If participation in civil society is limited to NGOs that separate the two, then the voluntary sector is yet another sphere with concrete borders that shut out women, such as those in this study, and thereby disconnect women from exercising their strategic interests. This is what social exclusion looks like locally.

Democracy allows for different ideals of civic life and many forms of engagement in different spaces for different people. Participation in meaningful groups exercising some form of democracy can take place in more arenas than party politics or formal voluntary organizations. A variety of groups that can be missed in such narrow definitions may include self-help groups such as NIMBY (not-in-my-back-yard) local interests (Schudson, 2006). Regardless of whether or not one agrees with the goals of such groups, they can be places in which to practise democracy and learn the skills of communication and working together. A variety of spaces are needed to facilitate learning that builds on the diverse capacities of individuals and communities. Even some seemingly therapy-focused groups, such as self-help networks, might lead to turning private troubles into public issues, although we lack empirical evidence showing how and when such private-public connections are made.

As previous chapters (particularly chapters 4 and 9) concluded, the collectivities we studied can foster the potential for making connections between individual problems and larger social forces. The family networks in which women with low incomes play key supportive roles are not likely to have the kinds of resources that can sustain them, and the people who rely on them and may drain their resources. The work of Dominguez and Watkins (2003) shows that ties with professionals in agencies were able to offer both instrumental and emotional support and that the latter proved to be unexpectedly robust. Our research also looks at how women from low-income neighbourhoods build relationships with people in community agencies (Fuller et al., 2008). Even when women were participating in the formal social service sector, their motivations for participation meshed material interests with a host of other strategic interests that can be interpreted as showing agency (Fuller, Kershaw, & Pulkingham, 2008) or the balancing of social support and social leveraging (Dominquez & Watson, 2003), even in relatively hostile environments for doing so.

Our data on women's work in collectivities allowed us to see that the provisioning of the social space was the catalytic source for women's ability to realize some of 'life's glories.' The organizations we studied made special efforts to involve participants in organizational processes and decision making, and thus to minimize the extent of differences among members. As a result, we could see that it was the interchanges among these women that had a catalytic effect on their growth. Change cannot happen if individuals are isolated by poverty or other types of social exclusion. Others are needed to imagine and discuss alternatives. In such arenas, 1 + 1 + 1 does not equal 3; interaction effects among participants result in conversations that are exponential - accompanied by the potential that different possibilities will emerge as a result.

Unfortunately, as we argued in chapter 9, current policy in Canada is following a model that equates not-for-profits with for-profit firms, that expects voluntary organizations to become more business-like so that they can take on the responsibilities being off-lQaded onto them from government (Stivers, 2002, as cited in Campbell, 2005, p. 702). Closing down collective spaces means cutting off these relationship pathways and the associated linkages that make transformation possible. We argue that what is needed is an examination of the capacity of groups such as those in the six research sites to bolster participation and engage in a critical analysis of what is happening to poor women.

Re-Enter the State to Assume Responsibility for Social Provisioning

The lens of provisioning used in the previous chapters showed that rights and responsibilities came together in the lives of women; the division between the two in theory and policy debates did not hold in lived experience, although the tension did. The provisioning responsibilities of women were shown to be extensive and often costly to their own welfare. Women talked poignantly, and with distress, about the shrinking of these spaces in which they could debate and practise negotiations of rights and responsibilities and examine how these affect their lives - and those for whom they carry provisioning responsibilities.

Because we collected data at both the individual and collective levels, we were able to trace the importance of the collectivities for women's well-being. When we discuss the term social provisioning, we do not use it to refer to the individual level, as Marilyn Power (2004) did in her discussion of the networks in which women provision. We endorse her premise that, in order to understand women's work, one needs to look at caring and unpaid labour as fundamental to economic activity; use well-being as a measure of economic success; analyse economic, political, and social processes and power relations; include ethical goals and values as an intrinsic part of the analysis; and interrogate differences by class, race /ethnicity, and other dimensions of inequality (Power, 2004). We hope that this was visible in the methodology and analyses throughout the book. Our rationale for keeping the term provisioning as central to our study reflects a policy focus in which the concept of social provisions is used to describe some of the responsibilities carried by an active state so that not everything is left to the so-called active citizen. An active state is essential if future cohorts of women are not to continue marching for bread and roses.

Of particular concern is the retreat of the state, as evidenced by the withdrawal of social provisions since the 1980s. At the same time that a North American and European discourse was taking hold about the development of civil society as a cornerstone for democracy, the power of nation states was being transformed by a globalized economy. During this time, the state increasingly abdicated responsibility for social provisioning on the one hand, while on the other, the particular types of actions that defined the active citizen, and the spaces within which participation was recognized, shrank. Those spaces in which women were participating and meeting their provisioning responsibilities were not seen as 'real' centres of civil society participation. Thus women were not seen as responsible active citizens. Their organizations were shut down, while the state withdrew supports, and voluntary agencies were turned into service providers. Such are the dynamics of oppression in that they undermine women as active citizens.

In order to enhance the well-being of citizens such as the women who participated in this study, the starting place is to recognize that low- income women carry many provisioning responsibilities. They are not scrambling to offload them. Many, but not all, are assumed willingly because they are tied to meaningful relationships. What is sought is recognition that these commitments, and the associated work, do exist with consequences for the women doing the provisioning! Defining non-employed people as dependents excludes them from entitlements that accompany those seen as contributing members of society - those who are employed. Likewise, thinking in terms of what types of provisioning women do does not position individuals as simply givers or receivers of care. The concept is more concerned with highlighting how responsibilities flow along pathways of relationships.

Where women's rights are based on policies focused on getting women into low-paying jobs, women with provisioning relationships are just further burdened. It is the labour market that is the problem, not the women. Part of the answer is to establish policies that recognize that citizens live multi-dimensional lives. Paid work is privileged in a market economy because it is the arena for earning money - an activity that is valued and brings prestige. All other types of work are devalued. Thus employment policies are needed that modify the effects of this privilege. Currently, the contradictions between competing sets of demands can be avoided only by those women who have resources to buy some assistance with their unpaid work. The resulting inequities actually exacerbate the situation of poor women.

Gender-based incentives to promote equity have utilized Nancy Fraser's idea of the universal caregiver. This approach engages men in performing their fair share of caregiving if women are to succeed in the Fight for bread.' However, as Olson (2003) cogently argues, even if a universal caregiver approach informs an active state policy approach, operationalizing such a model in a market economy where democracy is usually equated with an individual's right to exercise choice does not easily happen, even when active labour legislation encourages it. For example, until the mid-nineties Sweden's parental leave policy had salary replacement rates of up to 94 per cent. Despite such a strong incentive, examination of the Swedish experience revealed that income-replacement policies were not sufficient to attract men in the same numbers as women to take care leaves. Labour market priorities seemed to dominate individual and household decision-making. In this case, it revealed the dynamic that individuals incur costs beyond lost wages when they interrupt their labour force careers and, by contrast, shows the plight of poor women whose 'careers' begin with the testing grounds of women's collective efforts.

Paid work will continue to be privileged as the most valued approach to acquiring the needed resources for living. This will not disappear in a market economy, but a provisioning state can provide key resources that are now available only to households with higher incomes. The areas of child and elder care come readily to mind. Numerous studies document the need and the models used within and across countries. In Canada, women's groups have repeatedly argued that a viable national childcare policy is essential to women's autonomy. Yet multiple campaigns to institute one have met with stiff resistance over the years. Instead, a patchwork of tax benefits and subsidies keeps reappearing under different names. A parallel scenario is repeatedly enacted around calls for a national home- and community-care policy for elderly persons. These policy examples illustrate how class privilege interlocks with gender, race, class, and age to oppress particular groups of Canadians. The holistic concept of provisioning suggests that future research, and policies based on it, follow women's relationship pathways as trails to understanding citizens' need for both T>read and roses.' Policies that position people as citizens who carry a range of individual and collective provisioning responsibilities would increase the capacity of women to choose to engage in various forms of participation, including politics. From such spaces, other possibilities can develop.

Conclusion

This book has focused on the provisioning work that women do. We have argued that this work is done as individuals and as members of collectivities. This work is tied to the responsibilities that women carry. No matter what the work is, or whether it is engaged in by choice or coercion, relationships are central. The sites in which the data were collected allowed us to explicate the amount and complexity of this provisioning work. Along with these empirical data from participants, each chapter interrogated the socio-political context within which individual and group-based provisioning was occurring. What becomes clear from a trans-site perspective is that the state continues to have a powerful presence in the lives of women like the participants in this study - and in the collectivities of which they were members. Funding policies hooked to narrow definitions of service programmes, and social assistance payments based on women positioned as part of a labour market pool, are technologies of ruling that regulate behaviour and suppress resistance.

In 2012, many of the premises of Marshall's welfare state, along with its gendered assumptions, no longer hold. What we support is the spirit, the commitment to collective well-being, that gave rise to it. Our concern about the current civil society / active citizen discourse is that it excludes segments of the population and loads responsibility onto individuals like our participants while letting the state elude its responsibility to do social provisioning. One should expect to look to the state for social provisions that enable, support, and in some cases relieve the provisioning work carried by citizens. The state has the power to intervene in all spheres, but in the current neoliberal regime support is limited to the market sector. Any illusions that the state has shrivelled in a market economy should have been wiped away after seeing state responses to the recession of 2008-9 when market forces seemed to be jeopardizing the welfare of several nation states. As noted in chapter 1, central governments were called on to infuse millions into financial and industrial markets. As this chapter is being written, it seems that the intervention did stabilize these sectors of the society. It is unnerving to witness how the types of behaviour that led to the crisis are reappearing - quite literally it is business as usual; the excesses are criticized but accepted as the price to be paid if a market economy is to grow. This is the political economic context within which low-income women struggle to meet their provisioning responsibilities. The point to be taken is that the character of the non-interventionist state in the neoliberal drama is a myth - a guise assumed until powerful market players call upon it to exercise the tremendous powers at its disposal. Those same powers can be used to promote the quality of life of all citizens.

#### State and absolute refusal of markets privileges negative freedom over positive support for care.

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However, Rose also makes the claim about the mutation in the relations of power via a different path, where he drifts from second-order to first-order observations. To be sure, Rose generally operates on the second-order level when observing how objects of government are made thinkable and actionable by means of governmental rationalities and technologies.80 Yet, when suggesting a more positive characterization of “our plural present,” he replicates the stories of contemporary cultural theorists and sociologists about cultural differentiation, sub-politics, and aestheticized consumerism.81 While the forms of governing that replace “the social” might be problematic in a number of ways, Rose wishes to emphasize the positive potentials of social experimentation and alternative forms of political agency they now make possible: Within these spaces [of communities], it is possible for subjects to distance themselves from the cohesive discourse and strategies of the social state – schooling, public service resources and techniques of subject formation in order to invent themselves, individually and collectively, as new kinds of political actors.82 At this point, Rose does not remain merely diagnostic; he explicitly affirms a particular kind of self-inventing subject. The shift from detached second-order observation to affirmative firstorder description is complemented by Rose’s invention of what he terms “ethico-politics” (and later, as we shall see, “etho-politics”) to affirm the emergent field of contestation and experimental self-creation opened up by the withering of the social state.83 As a result of this domain of contestation over ethical self-government, Rose asserts that “old forms of political mobilization – the party, the program, the electoral mandate – are losing their attraction.”84 What is **missing** here is **attention to the cost** of **such a set of claims**, that is, of Rose’s **own production of knowledge**. He would probably agree that concept creation is not about producing valid representations of reality, that it unavoidably constitutes an intervention within a particular discursive terrain. In this sense, **conceptual work** – even when it rests upon “modest diagnostics” of empirically identifiable minor shifts – **is performative** in the sense of being a form of action within a discursive and practical context. As such, it is important to consider its possible effects as a form of action. What is at stake in the view that society as a knowable totality gives way to a “postmodern” acceptance of a sociality constituted purely by multiple forms of expertise, networks, or communities? What are the costs for political analysis of the privileging of politics as “active art of living” that opposes all obstacles to the vitalist self-assertion of the will to live through active self-creation?85 First, there are of course political costs of what is conceived as no longer being possible. They center on the difficulties, to say the least, of referring to the kind of knowledge of society or social structure that has been essential for public policy and provision as remedies against social inequality and as a condition of exercising civil, political, and social freedoms. To reject or displace the importance of such a form of knowledge is to put aside or diminish questions concerning the organization of state institutions, the prioritizing of resources, and the securing of minimum and universal standards. Does not a focus on the identifications that form communities or on aestheticized forms of self-creation through “somatic individuality” and an “ethic of vitalism”86 rule out, or at least undermine, this kind of knowledge and these **key political questions**? As far as the domains of multiple communities are concerned, we may then demand culturally sensitive services and diversified rights rather than uniform provision and universalism. In this respect, the “birth of community” seems to suffer from the same troubling fit with neoliberal strategies for dismantling welfare services and solidifying social segregation as does the postmodern discourse on cultural diversity and societal differentiation.87 There also are analytical costs, as pointed out by sociologists and geographers.88 It is simply very difficult to move between the local, the unique, the contingent, and the relatively unstructured to analyze extra-local contexts, systems, and institutional frameworks or to discern vectors, logics, and pathways that are embedded in larger-scale kinds of power and regulation. Rose and his colleagues are in danger of making a fetish of the **localized** and the empirical through a **methodological commitment** to **contingency**. A set of valid **methodological concerns** thus risks becoming an **untenable ontological commitment** to a particular vision of social and political life as unstructured flux and fluidity.89 As it stands, Rose’s ethico-politics is a politics of self-creation that abjures social policy and appears once the social state has been displaced. It is striking, however, that Rose comes very close, as do post-Foucauldians such as William Connolly,90 to a positive conception of civil society. Thus, Rose’s concept of politics seems to share the same space as civil society, i.e., it is an **extra-state space of innovation**, creativity, and critical contestation of state-centered politics and administration. While Rose may share with critical theorists and others a celebration of this realm and its self-creating agents, he brackets the long-lasting, central concern of this tradition to define the conditions of a thriving civil society, including what kind of an active sovereign state power needs to be in place for the **potentially lethal conflicts of civil society** to be kept in check. By adhering principally to a conception of power as productive and relational, Rose avoids these thorny issues and appears to leave us a fluid and experimental form of post-social politics. In short, there are elements of state-phobia in Rose and a related vitalism in the conclusion of his work on governmentality. These aspects become even more pronounced in his recent work on the multifarious contemporary dimensions of biopolitics from genetics to selfhealth practices and aesthetic interventions on the body.91 Here, Rose argues that the days of state-administered biopolitics, exemplified by the eugenic drive for biological and moral perfection, are over, and that they have been succeeded by alliances between self-creating consumers and pharmaceutical companies and biomedicine offering products and services for voluntary bodily improvements and risk minimization. Rose is at pains to avoid a purely negative view of this novel somatic ethics and recognizes the expanded possibilities for autonomy and self-formation offered by biotechnology, which “enables us to intervene upon ourselves in new ways.”92 The passage from “the social state” to “advanced liberalism” thus holds the promise of more diversified experimentation and contestation of truth claims about biological normality: “Our somatic individuality has become opened up to choice, prudence, and responsibility, to experimentation, to contestation – and so to a ‘vital politics’.”93 The phrase “art of living” is thus given a more substantive anchorage in the very materiality of the body (“somatic individuality”), and the concept of ethico-politics has been transmuted into etho-politics: By ethopolitics I mean to characterize ways in which the ethos of human existence . . . have come to provide the “medium” within which the self-government of the autonomous individual can be connected up with the imperatives of good government. . . . While ethopolitical concerns range from those of lifestyle to those of community, they coalesce around a kind of vitalism . . . in this highly contested domain, **somatic individuals** are the key actors.94 None of this escapes Rose’s earlier dilemmas. If anything, the aporiae of state-phobia become more acute. If we follow Rose and raise “life itself” to a **quasi-universal** contemporary **political agency**, then it is difficult to understand how active choices of self-creation can be available to all without raising the question of the role of the state in ensuring universal access to basic health, promoting innovations in biomedicine, surgery, and the pharmaceutical industries, and securing a set of standards so that life can be lived in this self-governing way. Otherwise etho-politics becomes the preserve of a privileged caste or, at best, unevenly distributed, which then gets played out in the appropriation and allocation struggles that have been at the core of the territorial state’s quest for civil peace and the welfare state’s concern for universal social rights. It is noteworthy, perhaps, that Rose’s ethico-politics breaks with Foucault with respect to the latter’s indebtedness to Kant. The dictum that “each person’s life should be its own telos” seems opposed to the Kantian idea of a responsible agent who needs to take aim at a particular present, a particular cultural situation and collectivity. In Rose’s politics, the ethical instance is not located within this kind of a mature attitude, but rather within a set of interrelations with human, non-human, and post-human forces. It seems to be at these intersections that Rose sees the emergence of a new type of ethical subjectivity as a kind of active self-creation in relation to the plasticity of life and corporeality. But how new is this proposal, given the long standing sociological assertions of “life as a planning project” and of vital self-creation of identity in late modernity?95 Along with the demise of the social state, this leaves us with a stance approaching **“negative freedom”** opposed to “all that which blocks or subverts the capacity of others asserting for themselves their own vitalism.”96 To summarize, we can identify four key aspects of Rose’s ethical subjectivity. First, it is located outside or at the fringes of the “social state” and is shaped by personal identifications with diverse communities. Secondly, it breaks free from or contests the conventional “welfarist” institutions and their authorized forms of knowledge. Thirdly, it is “free from” political impetus, and finally, it is particularly intense and innovative in the experimental practices of self-creation where human and non-human forces intersect.

#### Refusing the state entrenches inequality in health and education provision.

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A Vitalist Metaphysics? There are of course differences between Rose’s diagnostics of the present and the messianic narrative of Hardt and Negri with its duality of Empire and multitude. While the multitude is the vast, unmediated, immanent, and dispersed social subject permeated by, but nevertheless potentially subversive to, imperial domination, Rose avoids the binary around power and resistance by pointing to a set of mobile and multiple “conflicting points of opposition, alliance, and division of labor.”97 Moreover, these communities and somatic individuals are not spontaneous foci of resistance but are themselves produced in engagement with governmental practices and strategies and with newforms of knowledge and technologies. For Rose, things are never so simple as the phrases “from above” and “from below” would suggest. Such differences aside, however, we submit that there are deep affinities between the authors: they share a fascination with the “bio,” no doubt related to the successes of biomedicine and biotechnology around the turn of the twenty-first century, and concern for the deep ethical and political problems they raised. Biopolitics becomes central – albeit via different paths – to both projects, underneath which we find a common desire to discover a politics based on life and the living, on the energetic, the creative, the vital, and the nomadic. In Hardt and Negri, this vitalism takes the form of the “lived experience of the global multitude” that incarnates the will to be against98; Rose, quoting Deleuze, asserts that “we should oppose all that which stands in the way of life being its own telos” and that we should instead be “in favor of life, of ‘the obstinate, stubborn, indomitable will to live’.”99 Both privilege a politics that indicates “lines of flight” that are always in danger of becoming recuperated, organized, systematized, and programmed by systems of power and domination. We can hardly miss the similarities to the expressive and diverse singularity of the multitude when Rose speaks of those “moments of minoring, of breaking away, creating something new within the most traditional political forms, as when new practices of mobilization and protest are invented within the most organized forms of strikes, where new and mobile subjectivities form, swarm, and dissipate in mass mobilizations, marches, and demonstrations.”100 Where Hardt and Negri incarnate the vital in the multitude, Rose discovers it in a certain nomadic attitude to forms of struggle and contestation, or even the vital self-creative forces found in them. In spite of his complex reading of Canguilhem’s vitalism,101 however, we might ask whether and to what extent Rose joins with Hardt and Negri in invoking the Deleuzian “creative plenitude of a singular vitality.” Both approaches claim to dissolve the traditional state/civil society binary to indicate a new kind of politics beyond the state. However, they both oddly reinvent the traditional privilege given to the inventiveness, creativity, and mobility found not in the “rigidities” of the state and formal political organizations, but in a domain of energy, expression, and vitality that lies beyond them, opposes them, or occasionally breaks forth inside them. While we might characterize the multitude as a kind of hyper civil society, Rose’s “non-conventional communities” and “moments of minoring”103 that can be found even in the interstices of conventional political action and forms more closely resemble the quasi-natural creativity and vitality of a liberal civil society. This vitalism as well as the dissolution of the state and state-based politics that Rose and Hardt and Negri share could perhaps be traced to their parallel inspiration from Gilles Deleuze and his discovery in Foucault of “a certain vitalism” in which life is understood as “the capacity to resist force.”104 Lying outside the limitations and forms of the Foucauldian triad of knowledge, power, and subjectivity, this vitality is an ever-expressive reservoir of the virtual. One reason why these authors do not worry about such mundane problem as state organization and its role in establishing and maintaining civil peace, regulated freedom, and resource distribution is that the forces they wish to pave the way for concern the irruption of unspecified virtualities. Indeed, the “multitude” and “Empire” are for Hardt and Negri not representations of really existing ontological entities; they are “tools for identifying tendencies and imagining projects of constitution” that they believe already exist “in potential in the real.”105 For Rose, similarly, “an explicit and agonistic ethico-politics” is a potentiality inherent in our “plural present” where “creative ways of thinking and acting” offer “some limited grounds for optimism.”106 The ontology of potentiality, when mobilized by Hardt and Negri – and perhaps too by Rose – seems to privilege a world with less fixed structures, less universals, and accordingly less state – and hence a politics that is mobile, fluid, and nomadic. In both cases, what we have is a set of transcendent set of truth claims about valued political action that paradoxically emerge from an anti-foundationalist theory or analysis. These claims are grounded in the will to resist we find in the multitude’s lived experience or as the expression of an indomitable will to live. This politics has little to do with practical engagement with specific problems using an analysis of political forces and the resources available to achieve certain ends. As such, there is a case to be made for examining the affinity of these contemporary radicals with the “political romanticism” of the young revolutionaries who viewed the French Revolution simply as an organic expression of the free spirit.107Conclusion: Risks and Potentials

We have indicated several urgent concerns related to the state-phobia of influential postFoucauldian positions. The rather one-sided privileging of civil society or its proxies entails a number of risks. First, arguments for granting more space to the “diversity” of civil society, for instance in the shape of “ethico-political movements,” run the risk of reifying and solidifying differences of a social nature. Concepts of “diversity” or “difference” typically signify a diversity of lifestyles, personal values, community attitudes, ethnicities, etc. that should be respected, left to thrive and release their innovative potentials. However, differences are not just there to be respected prior to their discursive mobilization; even for Foucault, they are produced within different strategies and relations of power. This poses a serious problem for non-contextualized fascinations with the diversity of civil society. Second, identifying civil society as the site of ethical practices or even instructive morals easily leads to the identification of some “Other” that threatens to contaminate it: “The simple family remedy of identifying civil society with ethical life not only avoids confrontation with the uncivil nature of civil society, but opens the gate to the hunt for the Alien or the Other deemed responsible for its deformations.”108 While neither Rose nor Hard and Negri construct the state as Nietzsche’s “coldest of all cold monsters” or as Hobbes’ monstrous Leviathan, the state and the politics around it become a kind of occluded other. In Rose, the universalizing logics of the social state are displaced by a vital politics that opens new potentials of somatic individuality and self-creation. In Hardt and Negri, the nation state could only be viewed as a reactive modern order that is today irrelevant to the new vital forces of the multitude unleashed by immaterial production. The anti-state rendering of Foucault’s thinking on the state which we have detected in influential contemporary intellectuals displays a selective reading of what his statements actually said. Nevertheless, reinserting the problem of the state in post-Foucauldian thinking may require more than excavating, however carefully, Foucault’s own balanced position on the modern state. We will merely point out two key challenges that loosely reflect the above-mentioned risks. First, state planning and national policies have traditionally rested upon producing objective knowledge about the domains of economy, population, and society. By contrast, in post-structural thinking on civil society, the truth about society cannot be objectively known – it is created locally where it is diversely lived and experienced. Perhaps, then, a necessary counter-move for contemporary governmentality studies and poststructuralists would be to more broadly find ways of combining their deconstructivist tools with forms of knowledge that claim to speak the truth about society – for instance by **mapping patterns of inequality** or **documenting the effects of social security** or **access to education**. We regard the work of Randy Lippert and Kevin Stenson109 to be highly promising in this respect. Second, the imaginary of civil society as the site of ethical life entails that the ordering of the state be subordinated to this self-sustaining and vibrating life-world. Such subordination, discernable in contemporary civil society discourse and in our thinkers, runs counter to at least one key strand of post-Enlightenment thought that recognized the necessity of reconciling the recurring problems and “contradictions” of civil society with the substantive political and legal universality of the state. This, of course, raises the question as to whether it is possible to assert the necessity of a balance whereby the state would guarantee the freedom of citizens and collectivities on the basis of rational and calculable norms without taking an ahistorical or transcendental position. The most obvious way of tackling this question would be to ground this normativity in the genealogy of liberal-capitalist societies and the historically specific effects of the coexistence of formal equality (stipulated by modern rights of citizenship and the liberal legal and political order) and actual economic inequality (created and exacerbated by capitalist economies). Here, the emergence of the “Social Question” and the formation of a social domain in the nineteenth-century are paramount.110 Foucault did point to the tension arising from the concomitant advent of the juridical subject of right and the economic subject of interest, which he saw as posing a key problem for how government could function and be justified in welfare states. However, it was his interlocutors – most notably Donzelot, Procacci, and above all Castel – who described the governmental technologies and political rationalities that arose to resolve or navigate this tension: social insurance, social provision, and the social sciences.111 By taking this route, they went further than Foucault in arguing for the durability and eventhe necessity of “the social” as both a key zone of government, a fundamental object of interventions in liberal-capitalist states and a source of critical normativity.112 To be sure, Foucault strictly kept away from questions of the justification of state power in favor of an analytical critique whose focus is on the forms of veridiction (or truth-production) that governmental rationalities would take up. His painstaking descriptions of the forms of market rationality that liberal governmentality would mobilize display some of the potential costs of adhering to a market regime of veridiction.113 Today, notions of civil society as the site of personal bonds, self-expression, and cultural forces and of life as a domain of vitality opposed to conventional state politics or imperial domination have become key sites of veridiction. Foucault would probably be more concerned to lay out the effects of such truth production in terms of different governmental rationalizations. He would probably urge us to side with neither those who grant a priori privilege to these proxies of authenticity, virtue, and innovation, nor with radical advocates for state- or market-based regulation. The task would rather be one of taking aim at the practical political problems in the present while contesting naturalized and pre-given fixations of particular sites and agencies from which progressive innovation and critique is expected to originate.

#### Rejection of markets and competition lets corporations and elites off the hook. They support the separation of the economic sphere from the rest of social life. Applying care ethics to business is more likely to succeed than contrasting care and business.

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Too Easy on Corporations?

Does the fact that I have not roundly condemned global corporate capitalism mean that I think believe that things are good as they are? Of course not. Inequalities within and between nations are at levels that are totally morally unjustifiable and socially insupportable. Problems of climate change and other environmental consequences of our current fossil-fuel-based economics of production have driven many species to extinction and threaten our human future. Lucrative international trade in arms and drugs threatens stability everywhere. Concentrations of wealth and concomitant political power turn democracy into a sham.

One should, however, be leery of touting the benefits of businesses simply being local, non-profit, or small, as "structural" ways of assuring good behavior. "Local" can mean community-responsive, but it can also simply mean parochial and narrow-minded. Non-profit versus for-profit status may be more a matter of legal charters and tax filings, than of actual motivations or behaviors of complex organizations. (Witness, for example, the recently skyrocketing, corporate-CEO-mimicking, salaries of presidents of nonprofit colleges.) "Small" can be good when it means breaking up excessive concentrations of power, but it may also mean "too small" to do much good, or to create a beneficial countervailing, competitive counterweight to other more powerful interests. We can also be reminded by feminist scholarship that small, local, organizations dedicated to goals other than profit are not necessarily well-behaved: While, for example, "the family" is often idealized as a small scale organization based on love and connection, feminists are only too aware of the women and children crowding domestic violence shelters.

What my analysis claims is that we do not have to resign ourselves to our contemporary serious economic problems because "that's the way the system works," nor seek to jump from our present economic structures to something completely different before we can begin to address them. The myth that economies are machines essentially gives business leaders, workers, consumers, and investors operating within current system an ethical "free pass"—one can always fall back on the excuse that "the system made me do it." A better understanding of the role of justice and care in economic life instead demands commitment to ethical reflection and action in economic life, right here and right now.

Conclusion

The title of this volume, Applying Care Ethics to Business, might seem to imply that care ethics arises from somewhere outside of business, and must be brought in from the outside in order to be applied. This essay has argued, in contrast, that the image of businesses as immune to ethical concerns and operating outside of normal social relations is a fiction invented by a particular lineage of economic theorists. It has been accepted by so many because it is supported by culture-wide rigid and gender-biased patterns of thought.